Digitized  by  tine  Internet  Arciiive 

in  2008  with  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


littp://www.arcliive.org/details/appliedcitygoverOOjamericli 


APPLIED 
CITY  GOVERNMENT 

THE   PRINCIPLES   AND   PRACTICE 
OF    CITY    CHARTER    MAKING 

BY 

HERMAN  G.  JAMES,  J.D.,  Ph.D. 

ASSOCIATE  PROFESSOR  6k  GOVERNMENT  AND  DIRECTOR 

OF    THE    BUREAU    OF   MUNICIPAL    RESEARCH   AND 

REFERENCE   AT   THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   TEXAS 


I 


HARPER  y  BROTHERS  PUBLISHERS 

NEW    YORK     AND     LONDON 
MCMXIV 


^^6" 


.J-^ 


COPYRIGHT,    1914.    BY   HARPER  ft   BROTHERS 


PRINTED   IN   THE    UNITED   STATES   OF  AMERICA 
PUBLISHED    SEPTEMBER.    1914 

B-9 


CONTENTS 

CHAP.  PAGE 

Preface    v 

Introduction vii 

I.  Arrangement  of  Material i 

II.  Incorporation  and  Powers 5 

III.  The  Electorate 8 

IV.  The  Recall  and  Direct  Legislation    ....  26 

V.  The  Form  of  Government 39 

VI.  The  Administrative  Officers 54 

VII.  The  City's  Finances 80 

VIII.  The  Issuance  of  Bonds  and  the  Granting  of 

Franchises 88 

IX.  Conclusion 95 

A  Selected  List  of  References  on  American 

City  Government 97 

Index loi 


PREFACE 

ABOUT  a  year  ago  the  author  prepared  a  little 
Jx  pamphlet  entitled  *'A  Model  Charter  for  Texas 
Cities."  This  publication,  prepared  primarily  with  a 
view  to  meeting  the  needs  of  Texas  cities  contemplating 
action  under  the  recent  home-rtde  provisions  of  the 
state,  received  considerable  attention  from  those  inter- 
ested in  the  problems  of  city  government  throughout 
the  United  States.  From  the  number  of  requests  re- 
ceived for  copies  of  the  charter,  from  comments  received 
in  acknowledgment  thereof,  and  from  the  suggestions 
of  various  competent  persons,  the  writer  was  led  to 
conclude  that  an  enlargement  of  this  little  undertaking 
with  a  view  to  the  general  conditions  of  city  government 
in  the  United  States  as  a  whole  might  prove  an  accept- 
able contribution  on  the  subject  of  city  charter-making. 
A  number  of  valuable  suggestions  have  been  received 
in  the  way  of  criticism  on  the  Model  Charter  for  which 
the  writer  is  indebted  to  various  friends.  He  is  particu- 
larly under  obligations  to  his  colleague,  Prof.  Raymond 
G.  Gettell,  for  helpful  criticisms  and  suggestions.  Mr. 
Robert  M.  Jameson,  M.A.,  Secretary  of  the  Bureau  of 
Municipal  Research  and  Reference,  was  kind  enough  to 
prepare  the  bibliography  on  American  city  government. 

Herman  G.  James. 

University  of  Texas,  Austin,  Texas,  1914. 


INTRODUCTION 

No  phase  of  American  political  development  to-day 
is  more  striking  or  more  full  of  promise  than  the 
wide-spread  and  ever-increasing  interest  in  the  problems 
of  <jity  government.  This  increasing  interest  is  showing 
itself  both  in  the  affairs  of  practical  community  life  and 
also  in  the  attention  devoted  to  these  problems  in  our 
American  colleges  and  universities. 

Constitutional  provisions  and  enactments  of  the 
legislattires  dealing  with  municipal  government  are 
everjrwhere  being  subjected  to  scrutiny  and  in  many 
cases  to  amendment.  In  a  dozen  states  cities  are 
attacking  the  solution  of  their  local  problems  tmder 
home-rule-charter  powers  granted  by  the  constitutions. 

In  our  institutions  of  higher  learning  there  is  an  in- 
creasing amount  of  attention  being  paid  to  the  scien- 
tific study  of  the  peculiar  problems  presented  by 
mimicipal  government.  More  courses  are  being  offered, 
and  more  students  are  taking  these  coxirses  from  year 
to  year. 

In  both  of  these  situations  there  is  need  for  proper 
direction  and  guidance.  The  legislators  and  charter- 
framers  who  are  wrestling  with  the  practical  problem 
of  legislating  for  the  cities  are,  of  course,  for  the 
most  part  utterly  lacking  in  any  scientific  training  in 

vii 


INTRODUCTION 

the  subject.  They  cannot  and  will  not  read  through 
all  of  the  literature  on  the  subject  with  a  view  to 
extracting  therefrom  the  principles  they  are  to  apply. 
Their  only  guide,  then,  is  to  look  at  other  constitutions, 
laws,  and  charters  and  take  from  them  such  provisions 
as  appeal  to  them.  But  these  other  charters  had 
themselves  been  framed  without  proper  consideration, 
and  so  their  defects  become  perpetuated  in  every  sub- 
sequent charter  which  is  based  thereon,  with  small 
likelihood  of  a  critical  examination  and  revision.  What 
such  persons  desire  and  would  welcome  would  be  a 
presentation  in  brief,  comprehensible  form  of  the 
fundamental  principles  of  city  government,  expressed- 
in  a  way  suitable  for  enactment  in  the  charter. 

In  our  colleges,  in  the  same  way,  there  is  need  for 
constructive  material.  College-trained  men  will  in- 
evitably be  looked  to  as  leaders  in  any  campaign  for 
charter  legislation  in  their  communities.  It  is  not 
enough  that  they  should  be  trained  in  the  theory  of  good 
city  government  and  be  able  to  criticize  provisions  in 
existing  charters.  They  must  be  trained  to  put  their 
knowledge  into  practical  effect  by  actually  casting  it  into 
proper  form  for  adoption.  For  such  training  there 
must  be  some  material  available  for  illustration. 
General  descriptive  treatises  on  city  government  do  not 
furnish  such  material,  and  the  charter  material  avail- 
able is  not  only  for  the  most  part  illustrative  simply  of 
what  should  not  be  said  in  a  charter,  but  fails  also,  of 
course,  to  give  any  critical  discussion  of  the  points 
involved  in  the  various  provisions  inserted  in  the 
charters. 

It  is  with  a  view  to  meeting  both  of  these  needs  that 
the  present  work  is  offered.     Herein  are  presented  in 

viii 


INTRODUCTION 

logical  order  the  various  matters  with  which  a  charter 
must  deal,  with  a  statement  of  the  general  principles 
involved.  In  each  case  this  general  discussion  is  fol- 
lowed by  model  charter  provisions  which  put  into  prac- 
tical form  the  conclusions  reached  in  the  theoretical  dis- 
cussion. The  work,  therefore,  presents  a  model  charter 
which  can  easily  be  used  by  legislators  and  charter- 
framers  in  the  preparation  of  actual  charters  or 
municipal  laws,  and  by  students  in  fitting  themselves 
for  this  important  work  when  they  take  their  places  in 
the  life  of  the  community  to  which  they  go. 


APPLIED  CITY  GOVERNMENT 


APPLIED 
CITY    GOVERNMENT 


ARRANGEMENT  OF  MATERIAL 

THE  first  question  that  arises  in  taking  up  the 
task  of  preparing  a  city  charter  is  the  one  of 
arrangement  of  material.  What  is  the  proper 
order  in  which  to  take  up  the  various  matters  that 
must  receive  attention  in  the  fundamental  law 
of  a  city?  The  presentation  must  be  logical — 
i.e.y  follow  in  natural  sequence — and  concise — i.e.y 
avoid  unnecessary  repetition. 

To  begin  with,  since  the  charter  is,  first  of  all, 
the  instrument  that  confers  the  corporate  exist- 
ence on  the  city  and  endows  it  with  its  powers,  the 
opening  provisions  should  naturally  embody  that 
conferment  and  endowment. 

In  the  next  place,  since  the  basis  of  all  popular 
I 


A^PPLLED   eiTY   GOVERNMENT 

government  is  the  electorate,  the  constitution  of 
the  city's  electorate  and  the  manner  in  which  they 
exercise  their  powers  should  next  be  considered. 
All  the  provisions  with  regard  to  nominations  and 
elections  should  here  be  discussed. 

While  the  election  of  officers  may  be  tenned  the 
normal  function  of  the  electorate  in  a  represen- 
tative government,  there  have  developed  some 
extraordinary  functions  in  more  recent  times 
which  must  be  taken  into  consideration.  These 
are  the  recall,  which  is  the  reverse  of  the  electing 
process,  and  the  forms  of  direct  legislation  known 
as  the  initiative  and  the  referendum.  As  they 
represent  the  enlarged  scope  of  the  activity  of  the 
electorate,  their  consideration  should  follow  on  that 
of  the  ordinary  functions  considered  above. 

The  next  consideration  is  naturally  what  kind 
of  a  governing  body  shall  be  chosen  by  the 
electorate,  and  what  are  to  be  the  terms,  rights, 
powers,  and  duties  of  its  members.  This  involves 
the  fundamental  question  of  the  form  of  govern- 
ment for  the  city. 

After  discussing  the  governing  or  legislative 
body  of  the  city  the  question  arises  as  to  the 
organization  of  the  administration.  What  ad- 
ministrative officers  shall  there  be,  and  how  shall 
they  be  organized? 

The  management  of  the  finances  of  the  city 
being  one  of  the  most  important  of  the  city's  con- 
cerns, involving  both  the  legislative  and  the  ad- 


ARRANGEMENT   OF   MATERIAL 

ministrative  organs,  it  should  follow  immediately 
after  the  consideration  of  the  same. 

Finally,  experience  having  shown  that  two  of 
the  most  productive  sources  of  mimicipal  misrule 
in  the  past  have  been  the  power  to  incur  indebted- 
ness and  the  power  to  grant  franchises,  it  seems 
desirable  to  deal  with  these  two  important  matters 
in  a  separate  and  last  division. 

It  seems,  then,  that  all  important  matters  de- 
serving of  attention  in  the  city's  charter  will 
naturally  come  under  one  of  these  seven  main 
divisions.  The  subject-matter  will  therefore  be 
considered  in  seven  chapters  corresponding  to 
these  divisions. 

It  is  well  to  point  out  that,  according  to  the 
writer's  view,  the  function  of  a  city  charter,  like 
that  of  a  constitution,  is  to  be  as  brief  as  possible, 
providing  only  for  the  important  matters  and 
leaving  a  large  power  of  legislation  with  regard  to 
less  important  or  more  temporary  matters  in  the 
hands  of  the  governing  body.  Furthermore, 
while  in  a  number  of  cases  the  treatment  of  the 
subject-matter  contains  references  to  the  usual  con- 
stitutional and  legal  provisions  found  in  the 
various  states,  and  in  certain  cases  also  to  the 
accepted  judicial  views,  no  attempt  has  been  made 
to  take  into  consideration  the  countless  variations 
foimd  in  the  different  states  with  regard  to  certain 
aspects  of  the  problem.  In  certain  states,  there- 
fore, some  of  the  provisions  of  this  charter  would 

3 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

require  constitutional  amendments;  in  other 
states  legislative  action  would  be  sufficient.  But 
that  fact  does  not  affect  the  validity  of  whatever 
conclusions  herein  expressed  may  be  found  to  be 
correct.  Every  charter-framing  body,  be  it  a 
local  body  or  a  committee  of  the  legislature,  will, 
of  course,  have  to  take  into  accoimt  the  peculiari- 
ties of  its  own  constitution  and  laws  and  proceed 
accordingly. 


II 

INCORPORATION   AND   POWERS 

THERE  is  no  difficulty  with  regard  to  the  con- 
ferment of  the  corporate  capacity,  since  the 
characteristics  of  an  ordinary  corporation  with  re- 
gard to  the  possibihty  of  holding  property  in  the 
corporate  name,  suing  and  being  sued  in  the  cor- 
porate name,  etc.,  are  attributed  to  the  city  by  a 
mere  declaration  of  its  corporate  nature. 

With  regard  to  the  matter  of  other  powers,  how- 
ever, not  contained  in  or  derivable  from  the  mere 
fact  of  incorporation  some  difficulties  arise.  It  is 
a  fundamental  doctrine  of  our  public  law  that 
municipal  corporations  are  bodies  of  enumerated 
powers  and  have  only  those  powers  which  are  given 
them,  expressly  or  by  necessary  implication.  The 
unfortunate  results  of  this  doctrine  of  strict  con- 
struction are  too  well  known  to  need  further  dis- 
cussion here.  Being  obliged  to  go  to  the  legisla- 
ture for  every  new  power,  the  cities  have  become 
tools  of  the  state  political  organizations  for  their 
own  ends.  State  legislatures  in  the  fullness  of 
their  control  over  cities  have  not  seen  fit  to  confer 

5 


APPLIED    CITY   GOVERNMENT 

upon  them  general  local  powers,  but  have,  as  a 
rule,  preferred  to  deal  out  needed  or  desired  powers 
at  their  own  pleasure. 

There  are  two  possible  ways  of  remedying  the 
evils  of  this  detailed  regulation  by  the  legislature. 
One  is  for  the  legislature  itself  to  confer  upon 
municipal  corporations  a  general  grant  of  all  local 
powers  calculated  to  serve  the  welfare  of  the 
community  without  running  counter  to  the  legal 
prescriptions  of  the  central  government.  This  is 
the  method  which  has  been  adopted  by  continental 
European  legislatures  generally,  and  has  resulted 
in  the  remarkable  expansion  and  adaptation  of 
local  functions  to  community  needs.  The  other 
method,  and  the  one  that  seems  to  have  more 
promise  of  fulfilment  in  this  country,  is  to  grant 
general  powers  to  municipal  corporations  by  so- 
called  home-rule  amendments  to  the  state  con- 
stitutions. Various  states  have  adopted  this  plan, 
inaugurated  almost  forty  years  ago  in  the  Missouri 
constitution. 

Under  this  system  cities  are  given  power  to 
frame  their  own  charters,  subject  to  the  general 
laws  of  the  state  with  regard  to  matters  of  more 
than  purely  local  interest.  Some  state  control  is, 
of  course,  essential,  and  where  no  adequate  ad- 
ministrative control  is  provided  the  legislature 
must  exercise  it  through  the  power  to  pass  general 
laws  limiting  the  cities  in  dealing  with  matters  of 
state  concern. 

6 


INCORPORATION   AND    POWERS 

Whatever  powers  are  conferred  upon  the  cities 
by  the  constitution,  or  the  laws  under  general 
grants  such  as  have  been  considered,  should  be 
lodged  by  a  similar  general  grant  in  the  corpora- 
tion as  constituted  by  the  charter.  Any  attempt 
to  enumerate  the  powers  anew  in  the  charter 
would  be  useless  and  dangerous;  useless  because 
nothing  can  be  added  to  the  city's  powers  thereby, 
dangerous  because  the  courts  have  consistently 
held  that  an  enumeration  of  powers  will  be  con- 
strued to  exclude  powers  not  enumerated. 

The  grant  of  powers  contained  in  the  first  article 
of  the  charter  should  therefore  be  in  broad,  general 
terms,  and  could  be  simply  but  effectually  stated 
in  the  following  manner: 

ARTICLE   I — INCORPORATION  AND   POWERS 

The  city ,  hounded  as  follows 

,  shall  constitute  a  body  politic  and  cor- 
porate, and  shall  possess  all  powers  consistent 
with  the  laws  and  constitution  of  the  state  of 


Ill 

THE   ELECTORATE 

THE  qualifications  for  voting  even  in  local 
elections  are  usually  fixed  by  the  state  con- 
stitution or  by  act  of  the  legislature.  But  so  far 
as  the  city  is  left  free  to  determine  the  qualifica- 
tions of  its  voters  it  should  make  every  effort  to 
exclude  the  tmqualified  from  illegal  voting.  The 
principle  of  universal  manhood  suffrage  is  now 
so  generally  considered  an  integral  part  of  the 
American  political  system  that  any  attempt  to 
limit  it  by  property  or  even  intellectual  qualifica- 
tions would  probably  not  meet  with  general  favor. 
But  a  minimum  requirement  of  being  able  to 
read  and  write  should  at  least  be  insisted  upon. 
United  States  citizenship  should  be  required,  and 
a  residence  of  a  year  in  the  city.  Inscription  on  an 
official  voters'  list  and  identification  at  the  polls 
should  be  required  to  protect  against  illegal  voting. 
The  ordinary  disqualifications  for  mental  incapac- 
ity, conviction  for  crime,  and  violation  of  the 
election  laws  should  be  embodied  in  the  funda- 
mental law  of  the  city  where  not  required  by  the 
general  laws  of  the  state. 

8 


THE    ELECTORATE 

Having  determined  who  shall  constitute  the 
electorate,  the  next  matter  to  be  considered  is 
their  mode  of  exercising  the  franchise.  In  general, 
their  voting  right  will  refer  to  the  choice  of  their 
representatives.  The  manner  of  putting  names 
into  nomination  will  therefore  have  to  be  de- 
termined. 

Here  we  find  a  great  variety  of  practices  and 
considerable  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  best 
method  of  nomination.  In  the  past  our  political 
history  has  shown  a  steady  development  in  the 
direction  of  complexity.  First  the  nominating 
process  was  the  informal  act  of  a  few  friends  in  a 
semi-sociable  gathering.  Then  with  the  develop- 
ment of  party  machinery  came  the  legislative 
caucus.  This  in  turn  was  followed  by  the  conven- 
tion, which  is  still  found  to-day  in  many  states  of 
the  Union.  The  abuses  by  the  party  bosses  of  the 
power  they  wielded  in  the  control  of  these  con- 
ventions led  to  regulation  by  law  of  the  nominating 
process.  At  the  time  when  parties  were  given  no 
recognition  by  the  law  it  was  not  considered 
necessary  or  proper  to  go  back  of  the  election  to 
insure  the  people  a  proper  voice  at  the  polls.  But 
when  the  official  ballot  with  its  formal  recognition 
of  parties  and  their  nominating  methods  came 
into  use  it  was  seen  how  important,  and,  indeed, 
in  many  cases  decisive,  a  part  in  the  election  of 
representatives  of  the  people  the  nominating  proc- 
ess played. 

9 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

The  regulation  of  the  nominating  procedure  has 
taken  various  forms.  In  some  cases  the  party  con- 
vention has  been  minutely  regulated  by  law.  In 
other  cases  conventions  have  been  abolished  and 
primaries  established  in  their  place.  These  pri- 
maries in  turn  are  of  various  kinds,  closed  and 
open  party  primaries  and  non-partisan  primaries. 

Now,  without  going  into  a  careful  consideration 
of  these  various  forms  of  regulation  and  weighing 
their  relative  advantages  and  defects,  let  us  rather 
see  what  is  their  purpose  and  whether  it  cannot 
be  attained  in  a  simpler  manner.  In  essence  the 
theory  at  the  basis  of  all  these  laws  and  regulations 
is  that  the  right  to  be  nominated  is  a  valuable  right 
which  every  one  is  entitled  to  share  on  the  same 
basis  with  every  one  else.  That  basis  has  for 
years  been  a  party  basis.  That  is,  people  were 
supposed  to  be  lined  up  in  political  parties,  and 
hence,  if  every  party  chose  its  representative 
honestly  and  in  accordance  with  the  general  wish 
of  the  party,  then  every  voter  and  every  candidate 
was  getting  a  fair  deal. 

If  now  the  party  basis  were  the  only  sound  basis 
for  choosing  candidates  for  municipal  offices,  our 
past  experience  has  shown  that  some  regulation  in 
the  interests  of  fair  dealing  are  necessary.  But 
our  past  experience  shows  also  that  political  par- 
ties— that  is,  state  and  national  political  parties 
— ^have  had  a  most  pernicious  influence  on  city 
government  by  reason  of  the  subordination  of  the 

IP 


THE   ELECTORATE 

interests  of  the  locality  to  that  of  the  dominant 
party.  In  municipal  elections,  as  has  been  pointed 
out  again  and  again,  Republican  or  Democratic 
means  nothing  except  slavish  following  of  a  mean- 
ingless name,  for  these  parties  have  no  municipal 
programs.  Why,  then,  should  we  encourage  the 
continuance  of  this  abuse  by  giving  legal  recogni- 
tion to  those  parties  even  in  the  way  of  regulation? 
Candidates  for  election  in  a  city  can  stand  or  fall 
on  their  own  persons  and  programs,  and  the  in- 
dependent candidate  who  refuses  to  be  allied  with 
parties  whose  only  interest  in  the  city  is  to  control 
it  for  ulterior  purposes  should  be  encouraged. 

Here  we  have,  then,  in  the  so-called  primary 
legislation  with  continuance  of  the  party  ballot 
an  encouragement  of  this  imfortunate  domination 
of  local  affairs  by  state  and  national  political 
parties.  We  have  an  imwarranted  limitation  of 
the  freedom  of  election  and  a  discouragement  of 
independent  candidates.  We  have  also  twofold 
expense  and  trouble,  since  primary  elections  are 
in  every  respect  like  the  subsequent  elections. 

The  remedy  offered  for  this  undesirable  condi- 
tion is  the  non-partisan  ballot  with  freedom  of 
nomination.  By  freedom  of  nomination  is  meant 
real  freedom  attained  by  allowing  every  qualified 
voter  to  enter  his  name  for  appearance  on  the  offi- 
cial ballot  without  the  sometimes  very  difficult 
requirement  of  a  petition  signed  by  a  considerable 
number  of  voters.    Such  a  requirement  is  based 

XI 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

on  the  idea  of  preventing  an  excess  of  candidates 
who  have  clearly  no  chance  of  being  elected. 

This  fear  of  a  multiplicity  of  candidates  in  case 
it  is  made  too  easy  to  appear  on  the  ballot  seems 
to  be  without  justification.  In  the  first  place, 
the  maxim  holds  true  in  politics,  as  elsewhere, 
that  what  is  easy  to  get  is  usually  not  worth  the 
going  after,  unless  it  leads  to  something  that  is 
worth  while.  When  it  required  considerable  po- 
litical influence  to  obtain  the  party  nomination  it 
became  worth  while  to  struggle  for  it,  even  though 
the  party  was  defeated,  since  the  mere  nomination 
evidenced  political  power.  But  when  every  one 
can  without  any  influence  or  power  have  his  name 
appear  on  the  official  ballot,  the  mere  appearing 
there  is  no  longer  an  honor,  and  few  men  will 
appear  as  candidates  who  know  that  there  is  no 
possibility  of  their  being  elected.  That  these  con- 
siderations are  not  purely  theoretical  is  shown  by 
the  experience  of  England,  where  nomination  is 
practically  unrestricted  for  qualified  voters.  It 
is  a  well-known  fact  that  in  very  many  elections 
in  England  there  is  never  more  than  one  candidate, 
in  parliamentary  as  well  as  in  local  elections. 

Having  decided  on  the  method  of  selecting  can- 
didates, the  next  consideration  is,  of  course,  the 
election  itself.  This  question  presents  several 
phases,  such  as  the  time  and  place  of  elections, 
the  insurance  against  illegal  voting,  and  the  form 
of  ballot.     None  but  the  last  of  these  presents 

12 


THE    ELECTORATE 

any  great  difficulties.  The  time  of  elections  will 
usually  be  determined  by  the  state  law,  but  if 
not  it  has  been  found  wise  to  have  the  mimicipal 
elections  held  on  separate  days  from  the  state 
and  national  elections.  This  insures  greater  at- 
tention to  local  issues  and  eliminates  to  a  still 
greater  extent  the  influence  of  state  and  national 
parties.  The  place  of  elections  should  be  in  some 
public  building,  school-houses  being  usually  con- 
veniently located  and  easily  adapted.  The  state 
laws  against  illegal  and  corrupt  election  practices 
are  now  so  general  that  a  city  should  not  need 
to  legislate  on  that  matter.  But  the  city  should 
pass  regulations  for  the  adequate  registration  and 
identification  of  voters. 

The  question  of  the  proper  form  of  ballot  pre- 
sents some  features  that  merit  more  extended 
consideration.  We  have  already  pointed  out  the 
necessity  for  a  non-partisan  ballot,  and  now  we 
shall  consider  the  claims  of  the  so-called  preferen- 
tial ballot,  a  device  little  known  and  less  used  in 
this  country. 

Both  theory  and  experience  show  that  the  or- 
dinary ballot  in  use  is  a  defective  means  of  ex- 
pressing the  voter's  choice.  To  illustrate:  Sup- 
pose there  are  five  candidates  for  a  given  position, 
A,  B,  C,  D,  and  E.  Two  of  these  may  be  admi- 
rable men — ^A  and  B,  let  us  say.  The  other  three 
are  scoundrels.  The  voter  is  about  evenly  bal- 
anced in  his  opinion  of  the  candidates  A  and  B, 

13 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

but  would  not  under  any  circumstances  wish  to 
see  any  of  the  other  three  elected.  He  is  in  this 
predicament :  If  he  votes  for  A  he  is  voting  equal- 
ly against  B  and  all  the  other  candidates.  That 
is,  if  A  does  not  get  enough  votes  to  win  the  voter 
has  no  way  of  showing  that  he  would  much  prefer 
B  to  any  of  the  other  candidates.  He  might,  by 
voting  for  B,  have  elected  him.  But  by  voting 
for  A  he  has  actually  under  the  usual  ballot  voted 
against  B,  and  the  result  is  that  he  may  have 
made  it  possible  for  C,  D,  or  E  to  be  elected.  Now, 
of  course,  where  the  voter  in  question  is  a  single 
individual  he  would  not  appreciably  have  affected 
the  result.  But  where  he  represents  a  group  of 
voters  it  immediately  becomes  apparent  that  his 
real  intentions  as  to  the  candidates. have  been  de- 
feated because  he  could  express  only  a  partial 
opinion.     Such  a  situation  should  be  remedied. 

This  is,  however,  not  only  a  theoretical  objec- 
tion. Countless  elections  every  year  illustrate 
the  working-out  of  the  unfair  result  in  a  most 
unfortunate  way.  Let  us  suppose  that  in  the 
above  case  all  the  candidates  but  E  were  upright, 
capable  men  worthy  of  the  support  of  the  best 
element  in  the  community.  The  candidate  E, 
supported  by  the  bad  element  in  the  community, 
whose  voting  strength  need  be  only  a  little  over 
one-fifth  of  the  total,  will  be  elected  if  the  good 
votes  are  evenly  divided  among  the  good  candi- 
dates. 

14 


THE    ELECTORATE 

Two  methods  of  remedying  the  evil  of  minority 
election  have  been  tried.  One  is  to  require  an 
absolute  majority  in  a  subsequent  election  if  not 
obtained  in  the  first.  The  other  is  to  provide  the 
preferential  ballot.  The  first  method,  quite  com- 
monly found  in  Europe,  is  expensive  and  unsat- 
isfactory. It  is  expensive  because  requiring  a 
second  election.  It  is  unsatisfactory  because,  al- 
though insuring  election  by  a  majority,  it  does  not 
more  truly  represent  the  voter's  wish  -even  with 
the  second  election.  The  two  candidates  to  whom 
his  choice  is  limited  on  the  second  ballot  are 
chosen  in  the  first  place  by  the  same  defective 
process  which  enables  him  to  register  his  wishes 
in  an  imperfect  way  only. 

The  preferential  ballot  does  away  with  the  need 
of  a  second  election,  and  really  does  offer  a  mirror 
for  reflecting  the  full  wishes  of  the  voter  as  to  the 
claims  of  all  the  candidates  competing  for  the 
place.  Briefly,  the  preferential  system  of  voting 
is  the  employment  of  a  ballot  on  which  the  voter 
can  register,  in  addition  to  his  first  choice,  his 
other  choices  in  order  of  preference,  to  be  counted 
in  case  his  prior  choices  do  not  receive  sufficient 
votes  to  be  elected.  To  illustrate  again  with  the 
first  example  used:  If  the  voter  prefers  A  to 
all  the  others,  but  would  rather  have  B  than 
any  of  the  remaining  candidates,  he  can  indicate 
that  fact  by  marking  in  a  column  designated  ''first 
choice"  a  cross  after  A's  name,  and  in  a  column 
2  15 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

marked  "second  choice"  a  cross  after  B's  name. 
Should  he  have  any  choice  among  the  remaining 
candidates  he  can  indicate  that  fact  also  by  put- 
ting in  the  column  marked  ** other  choices"  a  cross 
after  the  names  of  those  he  is  not  absolutely  op- 
posed to.  The  names  after  which  there  is  no 
cross  would  then  be  those  of  the  candidates  whom 
the  voter  would  under  no  circumstances  support. 
The  ballot,  then,  would  look  something  like  this: 


Name 

First  Choice 

Second  Choice 

Other  Choices 

A 

X 

B 

X 

C 

D 

X 

E 



The  result  of  this  ballot,  as  will  be  shown,  in  the 
manner  of  counting,  will  be  to  give  effect  as  com- 
pletely as  could  be  desired  to  the  entire  wish  of 
the  voter  with  regard  to  these  candidates. 

This  brings  us  to  the  manner  of  counting  the 
votes,  which  is  just  as  important  in  preferential 
voting  as  is  the  proper  marking  of  the  ballots. 

i6 


THE    ELECTORATE 

The  marking  of  the  ballots,  indeed,  presents  no 
difficulties.  The  counting,  however,  is  not  so 
simple.  And  here  it  will  be  necessary  to  refer 
briefly  to  a  principle  of  voting  which  is  receiving 
wider  recognition  every  day,  and  which  has  been 
advocated  in  this  country  for  municipal  elections 
— viz.,  the  principle  of  proportional  representation. 

As  a  principle  of  representation  this  system 
might  logically  be  discussed  in  connection  with 
the  character  of  the  governing  or  representative 
body.  But,  as  the  method  of  voting  under  the 
proportional-representation  system  using  the  pref- 
erential ballot  does  not  differ  in  any  respect  from 
the  process  of  voting  so  far  described  until  the 
counting  of  vot^^^^  is  reached,  it  seems  perfectly 
proper  to  take  it  ^  /  here. 

In  the  first  place,  it  must  be  understood  that  the 
proportional-representation  system  can,  of  course, 
come  into  question  only  if  there  is  more  than  one 
office  to  be  filled.  We  must  assume,  therefore, 
for  purposes  of  discussion,  that  in  the  election 
represented  by  the  sample  ballot  above  there  are, 
let  us  say,  three  places  to  be  filled  and  five  candi- 
dates. In  that  case  each  voter  could  mark  three 
first  and  three  second  choices.  The  method  of 
counting  the  votes,  then,  for  the  ordinary  system 
of  majority  representation  would  be  as  follows :  If 
any  candidate  receives  a  number  of  first  choices 
equal  to  a  clear  majority  of  the  ballots  cast  he  is  de- 
clared elected.    If  all  those  voters  should  have  hap- 

17 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

pened  to  mark  the  same  three  names  as  their  first 
choices,  then,  of  course,  the  preferential  feature 
would  not  be  required,  and  no  further  counting 
would  take  place. 

But  suppose  only  one  candidate,  A,  has  re- 
ceived the  required  majority.  Then  instead  of  de- 
claring the  other  candidates  elected  in  the  order 
of  their  first  choices,  which  would  be  the  ordinary 
manner  of  determining  the  result,  the  second 
choices  cast  for  each  candidate  are  added  to  his 
first  choices.  If  it  then  appears  that  the  total 
of  the  first  and  second  choices  equals  a  majority 
of  the  ballots  cast,  in  any  case,  that  candidate  is 
declared  elected.  That  means  in  effect  that,  while 
a  majority  of  the  voters  did  not  consider  him 
the  best  man  of  all,  they  did  consider  him  eith- 
er the  best  or  at  least  the  one  they  would  like 
to  see  chosen  if  their  first  choice  should  fail  to 
get  the  required  majority.  The  result  would 
therefore  be  to  give  effect  to  the  voter's  opinion 
that  his  second  choice  rather  than  the  other  can- 
didates should  be  chosen.  If  now  only  one  candi- 
date has  received  a  total  of  first  and  second  choices 
equal  to  a  majority  of  the  ballots  cast,  the  other 
choices  are  added  to  the  first  and  second  ones  and 
the  candidate  receiving  the  highest  number  of  all 
the  choices  is  declared  elected. 

The  system  of  proportional  representation 
adopts  as  the  test  of  election  instead  of  a  major- 
ity of  votes  a  number  of  votes  equal  to  the  quo- 

i8 


THE    ELECTORATE 

tient  of  the  total  number  divided  by  the  number 
of  places  to  be  filled.  That  is,  if  there  are  three 
places  to  be  filled,  then  any  candidate  who  can 
poll  a  third  of  the  votes  should  be  declared  elected. 
If  there  are  not  enough  candidates  receiving  a 
third  or  more  of  the  first  choices,  then  the  second 
and  other  choices  are  taken  into  accoimt,  as  in 
the  case  of  the  ordinary  preferential  majority 
system  described  above. 

It  is  not  possible  here  to  enter  into  a  detailed 
discussion  of  the  merits  and  defects  of  the  propor- 
tional-representation princif)le.  But  one  or  two 
reasons  will  be  given  why  it  has  not  been  deemed 
advisable  to  incorporate  the  idea  into  this  pro- 
posed city  charter.  In  the  first  place,  as  has  been 
said,  the  principle  has  no  application  where  but  one 
office  is  to  be  filled.  It  has  increasing  applica- 
bility with  an  increasing  number  of  such  offices. 
But,  as  will  be  seen  later,  one  of  the  most  bene- 
ficial developments  in  our  city  government  has 
been  the  shortening  of  the  ballot — that  is,  the  de- 
creasing of  the  number  of  offices  to  be  filled  at  one 
time  by  election.  The  smaller  this  number  the 
better.  But  for  proportional  representation  the 
larger  the  number  the  better.  Of  these  two  con- 
flicting principles  the  one  of  the  short  ballot  is 
considered  more  important  than  that  of  pro- 
portional representation.  Furthermore,  where 
proportional  representation  is  made  a  burning 
poHtical  issue  it  is  usually  because  there  some  well- 

19 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

defined  minority  party  or  parties  are  permanently 
excluded.  We  have  already  seen  that  political  par- 
ties, at  least  as  we  have  seen  them  in  this  country, 
are  to  be  deprived  of  their  influence  in  local  af- 
fairs as  far  as  possible.  It  would  not  seem  to  be 
desirable,  therefore,  to  adopt  any  system  of  pro- 
portional representation  which  perpetuates  their 
influence.  Finally,  the  system  of  counting  the 
votes  as  advocated  by  one  of  the  leading  exponents 
of  the  proportional-representation  idea  as  applied 
specifically  to  the  more  recent  form  of  city  govern- 
ment in  this  country  is  entirely  too  complex.  We 
must  try  to  simplify  the  electoral  process  as  far 
as  possible.  But  this  proposed  method  of  count- 
ing votes  is  so  complex  that  it  will  not  only  be 
difficult  to  obtain  election  officers  who  can  under- 
stand it  and  to  avoid  errors  in  the  count,  but  it 
will  be  next  to  impossible  to  convince  the  voters 
that  after  all  that  complicated  performance  has 
been  gone  through  there  is  anything  left  of  their 
original  intention.  To  a  certain  extent  this  ob~ 
jection  may  be  urged,  indeed,  against  the  whole 
preferential  ballot.  But  the  simplest  one  of  vari- 
ous possible  ways  of  counting  the  ballots  has  been 
adopted,  and  it  is  believed  that  the  evident  ad- 
vantages will  outweigh  the  inconveniences. 

One  matter  of  minor  importance,  perhaps,  that 
might  be  mentioned  in  connection  with  the  form  of 
the  ballot  is  the  question  of  order  of  appearance 
of  names.     The  natural  scheme  of  an  alphabetical 

20 


THE    ELECTORATE 

arrangement  has  the  disadvantage  that  it  gives  an 
undue  advantage  to  the  candidates  whose  names 
begin  with  a  letter  near  the  beginning  of  the  alpha- 
bet. It  is  an  undoubted  advantage  to  appear  first 
on  the  ballot,  and  therefore  some  plan  should  be 
devised  for  distributing  that  advantage.  The  de- 
vice of  determining  by  lot  is  sometimes  used.  But 
to  this  it  may  be  answered  that  if  chance  is  to 
determine  the  order  it  might  just  as  well  be  the 
chance  alphabetical  arrangement  of  the  candidates 
in  any  given  election.  A  better  plan  is  to  distrib- 
ute the  advantage  equally  among  all  the  candi- 
dates. This  can  be  done  by  printing  as  many  sets 
of  ballots  as  there  are  candidates,  each  set  begin- 
ning with  the  name  of  a  different  candidate,  and 
proceeding  in  regular  order  through  the  list. 

Having  considered  briefly  in  order  the  various 
matters  that  arise  in  connection  with  the  exercise 
of  the  voting  franchise  in  its  ordinary  manifesta- 
tions, it  will  now  be  possible  to  embody  the  con- 
clusions reached  in  the  form  of  charter  provisions 
somewhat  as  follows: 

ARTICLE  II — THE  ELECTORATE 

Sec.  I.  The  right  to  vote  for  the  elective 
officers  of  the  city  shall  be  enjoyed  by  all  adult 
males y  who  are  citizens  of  the  United  States,  who 
are  able  to  read  and  write,  who  have  resided  a 

21 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

year  in  the  city,  who  are  properly  enrolled  on 
the  official  voters'  list  and  are  not  disqualified 
for  any  of  the  following  causes :  mental  incapac- 
ity,  conviction  for  crime,  violation  of  the  election 
laws  and  ordinances. 

Sec.  2.  Any  qualified  voter  shall  be  eligible 
to  any  elective  office  and  may  have  his  name 
placed  upon  the  official  ballot  by  filing  with  the 
city  clerk,  not  more  than  one  month  nor  less  than 
two  weeks  before  the  date  of  the  election,  a  state- 
ment of  his  proposed  candidacy  together  with 
an  affidavit  signed  by  two  other  qualified  voters 
of  the  city  that  he  is  duly  qualified  under  the  law 
and  not  suffering  under  any  legal  disability, 
temporary  or  permanent.  If  no  more  candi- 
dates qualify  than  there  are  places  to  be  filled 
they  shall  be  declared  elected  without  a  vote 
upon  the  certificate  of  the  city  clerk.  If  no  can- 
didate qualifies  in  the  manner  prescribed,  the 
ballots  shall  be  printed  without  any  names  and  it 
shall  be  lawful  for  any  voter  to  write  the  names  of 
any  qualified  electors  upon  the  ballot,  indicating 
his  order  of  preference  as  in  the  ordinary  case. 

Sec.  3.  The  ballots  shall  be  printed  by  the 
city  and  shall  contain  the  names  of  the  candi- 
dates without  party  or  other  designation.     The 

23 


THE    ELECTORATE 

order  of  arrangement  of  the  names  shall  he 
alphabetical  in  rotation.  That  is,  there  shall  he 
as  many  sets  of  hallots  printed  as  there  are  candi- 
dates. Each  set  of  hallots  shall  hegin  with  the 
name  of  a  different  candidate,  the  other  names 
being  arranged  thereafter  in  regular  alphabetical 
order,  commencing  with  the  name  next  in  alpha- 
betical order  after  the  one  that  stands  first  on 
that  set  of  ballots.  When  the  last  name  is 
reached  in  alphabetical  order  it  shall  be  followed 
by  the  name  that  begins  with  the  first  letter 
represented  in  the  list  of  names  and  by  the  others 
in  regular  order. 

After  the  column  containing  the  names  of 
the  candidates,  arranged  as  indicated,  there 
shall  he  printed  three  columns  headed  ^' first 
choice,'"  ''second  choice,'"  and  ''other  choices," 
respectively.  Each  voter  shall  he  entitled  to 
place  as  many  crosses  in  the  column  marked 
"first  choice"  as  there  are  offices  to  be  filled. 
He  shall  also  he  entitled  to  place  as  many  crosses 
in  the  column  marked  "second  choice"  as  there 
are  offices  to  be  filled,  provided  that  he  may  not 
mark  a  cross  in  the  column  marked  "second 
choice"  after  a  name  for  which  he  has  marked 

a  cross  in  the  first  column.    He  may  also  place 

23 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

in  the  column  marked  ''other  choices''  crosses 
after  any  names  which  he  has  not  designated  as 
first  or  second  choice. 

Sec.  4.  The  ballots  shall  be  counted  by  adding 
up  the  first  choices  cast  for  each  candidate.  If 
any  candidates  receive  a  number  of  first  choices 
equal  to  a  majority  of  all  the  ballots  cast,  they 
shall  be  declared  elected  in  the  order  of  the  votes 
received.  If  no  candidate  has  received  such  a 
majority y  then  the  number  of  second  choices  cast 
for  each  candidate  shall  be  counted  and  shall 
be  added  to  the  number  of  first  choices.  Any 
candidates  who  have  now  a  total  of  first  and 
second  choices  equal  to  a  majority  of  all  ballots 
cast  shall  be  declared  elected  in  the  order  of  the 
number  of  votes  received.  If  not  a  sufficient 
number  of  candidates  have  yet  received  the  re- 
quired majority y  the  other  choices  cast  for  each 
candidate  shall  be  added  to  his  first  and  second 
choices  J  and  candidates  shall  be  declared  elected 
in  the  order  of  the  number  of  votes  received. 
In  case  of  a  tie,  the  order  of  precedence  shall  be 
determined  by  lot.  Provision  shall  be  made  by 
the  governing  body  of  the  city  for  preventing 
fraud  in  elections  and  for  the  recount  of  and 
other  necessary  control  over  the  ballots, 

24 


THE    ELECTORATE 

Sec.  5.  Polling' places  shall  he  in  school- 
houses  or  in  other  convenient  public  buildings. 

Sec.  6.  Elections  for  city  officers  shall  be 
on  different  days  from  those  on  which  county ^ 
state,  or  national  elections  are  held. 

Sec.  7.  The  city  governing  authority  shall 
make  all  needful  rules  and  regulations  for  the 
carrying  into  effect  of  the  provisions  of  this 
article. 


IV 

THE   RECALL  AND  DIRECT  LEGISLATION 

IT  is  necessary  to  devote  a  separate  division  to 
the  discussion  of  the  questions  presented  under 
this  heading,  for  they  present  somewhat  different 
aspects  from  the  ordinary  manifestations  of  the 
electoral  franchise  considered  in  the  last  chapter. 
Considering  first  the  recall,  which  is  more  like 
the  electoral  activity  discussed  above,  let  us  see 
what  can  be  said  in  justification  of  this  rather 
modem  governmental  device.  Until  compara- 
tively recent  times  in  this  country  it  was  thought 
that  a  sufficient  responsiveness  to  public  opinion 
on  the  part  of  elective  representatives  could  be 
secured  by  the  need  of  their  coming  before  the 
people  at  regular  intervals  for  re-election.  Ex- 
perience has  shown,  however,  that  that  safeguard 
was  not  always  sufficient  to  prevent  improper 
action  on  the  part  of  elective  officials  even  when 
they  were  planning  to  stand  for  re-election.  The 
grosser  forms  of  actual  malfeasance  could,  indeed, 
be  gotten  at  by  a  court  or  impeachment  process, 
but  these  were  at  best  cumbersome  weapons  and 

26 


THE    RECALL 

not  at  all  adapted  to  prevent  action  in  defiance 
of  the  clearly  expressed  will  of  the  electorate. 
And  the  possibility  of  defeat  at  the  polls  was 
shorn  of  its  terror  by  the  support  of  active  party 
forces  and  by  the  indifference  of  the  public,  who 
are  quick  to  forget  violations  of  public  faith  when 
they  themselves  are  not  financially  affected  or 
otherwise  materially  injured. 

It  was  believed,  therefore,  that  some  method 
should  be  devised  whereby  an  elective  officer 
could  be  called  to  account  by  his  constituents  at 
a  time  when  resentment  for  his  misdeeds  was  still 
warm  and  effective.  Furthermore,  there  was  no 
control  over  an  officer  who,  not  desiring  re-election, 
was  making  the  best  of  his  power  for  improper 
purposes:  Finally,  with  the  growing  tendency 
toward  increasing  official  terms  of  office  it  was  be- 
lieved proper  to  provide  a  possibility  of  prevent- 
ing improper  persons  from  remaining  in  office  after 
their  unfitness  had  been  clearly  demonstrated. 
These  considerations  are  all  very  sound  and 
worthy  of  approval. 

At  the  same  time  it  must  be  clearly  kept  in 
mind  that  the  situations  which  call  for  this  safe- 
guard are  abnormal  or  emergency  situations.  If 
the  electorate  chooses  an  officer  for  a  term  of 
years,  there  is  no  reason  why  that  officer  should 
have  to  stand  for  re-election  again  before  his  term 
is  up,  unless  he  has  acted  in  a  manifestly  improper 
way.     The  recall,  already  found  in  many  charters 

27 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

to-day,  provides  a  way  of  bringing  an  official  to 
the  bar  of  public  opinion  before  the  expiration  of 
his  term.  It  should  be  conditioned  on  the  proper 
state  of  affairs,  or  the  device  which  was  meant  to 
insure  responsive  government  will  become  an  in- 
strument of  unfairness.  If  available  too  easily  it 
becomes  a  weapon  of  unrighteousness  rather  than 
of  righteousness. 

The  recall  is  invoked  by  a  petition  signed  by  a 
number  of  voters  calling  for  a  general  vote  as  to 
whether  or  not  a  given  candidate  shall  be  permitted 
to  remain  in  office.  Now  if  this  required  number 
of  voters  is  too  small  it  opens  the  way  for  every 
defeated  minority  to  compel  the  successful  oppo- 
sition candidate  to  be  elected  again,  for  nothing 
need  be  proven  against  a  man  to  invoke  the  peti- 
tion. It  is  sufficient  to  allege  improper  conduct 
in  office  and  then,  like  the  old  sink-or-swim  test  of 
culpability,  the  guilt  or  innocence  is  determined 
by  the  outcome  of  an  event  which  may  or  may  not 
have  anything  to  do  with  the  question  involved. 

It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  the  political  sup- 
port which  comes  from  being  a  good  officer  is  more 
passive  by  far  than  the  political  opposition  that 
comes  from  considerations  of  self  or  party  in- 
terests. A  wholly  desirable  officer  is  as  freely  ex- 
posed to  the  machinations  of  defeated  opponents 
under  the  recall  as  is  an  undesirable  officer  to  the 
justifiable  opposition  of  the  outraged  feelings  of 
the  community.     Only  there  is  this  difference, 

28 


THE    RECALL 

and  an  important  one,  that  the  supporters  of  the 
good  officer  are  much  more  Hkely  to  forget  to  come 
to  the  polls  when  the  recall  election  is  held  than  are 
the  political  opponents  of  the  officer  in  question. 
It  is,  therefore,  a  serious  thing  to  subject  an  officer 
to  the  necessity  of  submitting  to  a  recall  election, 
and  the  possibility  should  be  properly  safeguarded. 

The  simplest  way  to  safeguard  the  abuse  of  this 
instrument  of  control  is  manifestly  to  make  it 
sufficiently  difficult  to  put  into  operation  to  insure 
that  it  will  not  be  used  without  proper  grounds. 
If,  as  we  have  seen,  the  recall  is  to  remedy  an  un- 
usual situation  it  should  not  be  used  except  in 
cases  where  an  unusual  demand  exists  for  its  em- 
ployment. ^  This  must  be  insured  by  requiring  a 
large  percentage  of  voters  to  sign  the  petition  in 
order  to  put  it  into  operation. 

In  determining,  then,  the  percentage  of  voters 
who  should  be  required  to  sign  a  recall  petition 
our  starting-point  will  be  to  make  it  as  high  as 
possible  without  making  the  instrument  wholly 
unusable.  Of  course,  an  upper  limit  is  set  by  the 
fact  that  if  more  than  fifty  per  cent,  were  re- 
quired there  would  be  no  need  of  an  election  at 
all.  Inasmuch  as  even  the  most  important  elec- 
tions do  not  bring  out  anything  like  a  full  vote, 
it  would  be  unreasonable  to  insist  on  a  percentage 
of  voters  which  is  in  fact  not  required  to  deter- 
mine the  outcome  of  any  popular  vote.  Taking 
as  an  average  vote  in  an  important  election  sev- 

29 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

enty  per  cent,  of  the  total  electorate,  the  natural 
requirement  would  seem  to  be  thirty-five  per 
cent,  of  that,  or  one-half  of  the  usual  vote,  as  a 
condition  of  putting  the  recall  into  operation. 
This  would  demand  the  unusual  interest  which 
an  emergency  measure  should  require  without 
at  the  same  time  making  it  impossible  to  use  it 
if  a  real  emergency  does  present.  An  abuse  that 
cannot  arouse  a  third  of  the  total  electorate  to 
protest  can,  it  would  seem,  wait  until  the  expira- 
tion of  the  term  of  office  of  the  man  in  question 
for  rectification  at  the  polls. 

This  brings  us  to  a  consideration  of  the  other 
extraordinary  activity  of  the  electorate — namely, 
direct  legislation.  Let  us  here  again  examine 
what  the  reason  or  justification  for  this  device 
may  be. 

We  may  begin  with  the  proposition  that  our 
form  of  government  in  this  country — national, 
state,  and  local — ^has  been  and  was  intended  to  be 
a  representative  form  as  distinguished  from  a 
democratic  form.  The  New  England  town  was 
an  exception  to  the  general  rule,  which,  as  the 
frequent  references  thereto  testify,  by  its  excep- 
tional character  proved  the  rule.  The  represen- 
tative form  was  indeed  the  only  one  known  in 
practice  to  our  forefathers,  and  was  the  one  they 
would  naturally  have  adopted  on  general  prin- 
ciples, even  leaving  out  of  account  the  practical 
considerations  that  made  it  impossible  for  them 

30 


DIRECT   LEGISLATION 

to  do  anything  else.  The  initiative  and  the 
referendum  are  departures  from  the  representative 
principle  and  adoptions  to  that  extent  of  the  form 
of  direct  democracy. 

Now,  what  are  the  reasons  for  this  change?  Let 
us  look  at  the  earlier  manifestations  of  the  direct- 
democracy  principle  before  we  come  to  the  com- 
paratively modem  application  now  made  of  it 
in  many  cities.  Our  earliest  state  constitutions, 
contained  no  provisions  for  the  referendum,  even 
on  constitutional  changes.  In  fact,  many  of  them 
were  adopted  and  changed  without  ratification 
by  the  people.  One  of  the  first  applications  of 
the  referendum  was  in  this  matter  of  constitu- 
tions. The  reason  for  that  is  clear.  Since  the 
constitution  of  the  state  is  the  supreme  law  there- 
of, delimiting  even  the  activities  of  the  legislattue, 
being,  indeed,  the  manifestation  of  the  sovereign 
will  of  the  state  as  distinguished  from  the  repre- 
sentative body,  it  was  highly  desirable,  not  to  say 
necessary,  that  the  persons  in  whom  the  sovereign 
power  resided — namely,  the  people — should  have 
a  voice  in  the  making  and  changing  of  their  fim- 
damental  law.  This  departure  from  the  strict 
representative  principle  was  clearly  justified  by 
the  concepts  of  our  constitutional  system.  The 
same  considerations  will  apply  to  the  adoption  or 
amendment  of  a  city  charter  by  vote  of  the  elec- 
torate. 

Another  departure  from  the  representative  prin- 
3  31 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

ciple  which  had  received  a  rather  wide  acceptance 
in  our  states  is  found  in  the  so-called  local-option 
laws,  particularly  as  applied  to  the  matter  of  the 
liquor  traffic.  This  departure  can  be  justified 
on  another  simple  principle  of  our  public  law — 
namely,  the  principle  of  local  self-government.  It 
is  not  so  much  a  case  of  the  people  in  a  locality 
legislating  in  place  of  the  representative  body  in 
that  locality.  It  is  rather  a  case  of  the  people  of 
a  locality  determining  whether  or  not  a  law  of 
local  application  passed  by  a  central  legislative 
body  shall  be  put  into  operation  or  not.  This  does 
not  involve  an  attack  on  the  representative  prin- 
ciple as  such. 

Finally,  there  may  be  mentioned  another  com- 
mon illustration  of  the  use  of  the  referendum, 
which,  while  implying  a  distrust  of  the  representa- 
tive principle  to  a  certain  extent,  is  also  justified 
by  peculiar  circumstances.  The  use  of  the  referen- 
dum in  question  is  the  one  for  approving  or  re- 
jecting the  issuance  of  municipal  bonds  and  the 
granting  of  municipal  franchises.  It  is  true  that 
an  absolute  confidence  in  the  representative  prin- 
ciple would  leave  these  matters  also  to  the  elected 
body.  But  these  matters  may  readily  be  dis- 
tinguished from  most  matters  of  ordinary  legis- 
lation in  that  the  action  of  the  representative 
body  in  these  important  regards  is  not  capable 
of  rectification  by  the  action  of  the  electorate  at 
the  polls.     It  is  of  little  use  to  console  a  citizen- 

32 


DIRECT   LEGISLATION 

ship  burdened  down  with  debt  and  deprived  of 
valuable  rights  in  their  streets  by  surrender  to 
private  corporations  with  the  thought  that  at  the 
next  election  they  can  vote  their  faithless  repre- 
sentatives out  of  office  and  elect  in  their  place 
men  who  will  undo  the  damage.  It  is  too  late 
for  that,  and  even  the  recall  will  give  but  an  un- 
satisfactory revenge.  The  only  effective  safe- 
guard is  to  require  the  assent  of  those  so  vitally 
concerned  before  the  damage  is  done. 

So  much  for  applications  of  the  principle  of  di- 
rect legislation  which  stand  on  special  footings. 
What,  now,  can  be  said  of  the  proposal  to  extend 
that  principle  to  all  measures,  whatever  their 
nature,  and  not  merely  to  the  acceptance  or  re- 
jection of  measures  passed  by  the  representative 
body,  but  also  to  the  initiation  by  popular  action 
of  legislative  measures?  If  the  advocates  of  the 
extension  of  direct  legislation  rested  their  case  on 
the  proposition  that  representative  government 
is  unsound  and  unsuccessful,  and  should  be  super- 
seded by  direct  democratic  government,  there 
would  be  little  danger  of  such  extreme  views  being 
adopted.  In  spite  of  the  facility  of  intercourse, 
the  ease  of  transmission  of  intelligence,  and  the 
instruments  of  popular  enlightenment,  a  pure 
democracy  is  as  unworkable  to-day  as  it  was  in 
the  days  of  Madison;   in  fact,  more  so. 

But  the  supporters  of  the  new  movement  rest 
their  case  on  the  fact  that  they  seek,  not  to  de- 

33 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

stroy  representative  government,  but  to  create  it. 
They  say  that  representative  government  in  this 
country  is  not  representative,  and  the  only  way 
to  make  it  so  is  to  give  the  people  power  to  do  for 
themselves  what  their  representatives  will  not  do. 
So  they  advocate  giving  to  the  voters  the  power  to 
initiate  legislation  or  to  pass  upon  it  when  enacted 
by  their  representatives  in  order  to  insure  action 
on  the  part  of  such  representatives  which  is  truly 
representative. 

Now,  as  a  weapon  or  means  of  assuring  repre- 
sentative government  these  instruments  stand  on 
quite  a  different  footing  from  their  use  as  substi- 
tutes for  representative  government.  But  the 
fact  must  not  be  lost  sight  of  that  if  their  use  is 
made  too  easy  it  will  be  the  latter  result  and  not 
the  former  which  will  occur.  As  in  the  case  of 
the  recall,  their  value  will  not  only  be  destroyed, 
but  they  will  become  possible  sources  of  great  in- 
convenience if  invoked  too  easily.  The  same  con- 
siderations therefore  would  seem  to  point  to  a 
similar  requirement  of  a  petition  of  thirty-five 
per  cent,  of  the  voters  to  call  them  into  opera- 
tion. The  special  requirements  for  an  obligatory 
referendum  in  the  case  of  bond  issues  and  grants 
of  franchises  in  the  public  streets  will  be  con- 
sidered in  Chapter  VII I. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  embody  the  pro- 
visions with  regard  to  the  initiative,  the  referen- 
dum, and  the  recall  in  our  charter  as  follows: 

34 


DIRECT    LEGISLATION 

ARTICLE    III — THE  RECALL  AND  DIRECT  LEGIS- 
LATION 

Sec.  I.  (a)  Any  elective  officer  of  the  city 
shall  he  subject  to  a  recall  election  at  any  time 
after  six  months  of  his  term  have  expired.  The 
petition  for  the  recall  election  must  he  signed  by 
thirty-five  per  cent,  of  the  qualified  voters  of  the 
city  as  shown  by  the  voters'  list  kept  by  the 
city  clerk.  The  election  must  be  held  within 
thirty  days  of  the  filing  of  the  petition,  unless  a 
regular  election  occurs  within  sixty  days,  in 
which  case  the  voters  shall  vote  on  the  recall  at 
the  regular  election.  In  either  case  there  shall 
be  a  special  ballot  containing  the  name  of  the 
officer,  the  position  which  he  holds,  and  the 
dates  of  the  beginning  and  termination  of  his 
official  term.  Below  the  name  of.  the  officer  shall 
be  the  two  phrases  ''for  the  recall''  and  ''against 
the  recall,"  one  below  the  other,  with  a  space 
after  each  for  the  placing  of  a  cross  where  de- 
sired. If  a  majority  of  the  ballots  and  at  least 
thirty-three  per  cent,  of  the  registered  votes  show 
a  vote  for  the  recall,  the  office  in  question  shall  he 
thenceforth  vacant. 

(b)  //  an  officer  is  recalled  as  provided  for 
35 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

above,  he  shall  not  be  eligible  for  re-election  at 
the  special  election  to  be  called  for  filling  the 
vacancy  thus  created.  He  shall  be  eligible  for 
re-election  when  the  term  for  which  he  was  origi- 
nally elected  shall  have  expired, 

(c)  //  a  recall  election  results  in  a  failure  to 
secure  a  majority  of  votes  in  favor  of  the  recall, 
the  officer  in  question  shall  not  again  be  sub- 
jected to  a  recall  election  until  after  the  expira- 
tion of  a  year  from  the  time  at  which  the  first 
recall  election  was  held. 

(d)  Vacancies  created  by  a  recall  election 
shall  be  filled  in  the  same  manner  as  is  provided 
for  the  filling  of  vacancies  in  the  governing  body 
due  to  other  causes. 

Sec.  2.  (a)  No  act,  ordinance,  resolution,  or 
order  of  the  governing  body  of  the  city  shall,  un- 
less it  be  declared  an  emergency  measure  on  the 
ground  of  urgent  public  need,  go  into  effect  until 
thirty  days  after  its  passage.  If  at  any  time 
within  the  thirty  days  a  petition  signed  by 
thirty-five  per  cent,  of  the  qualified  voters  is 
presented  to  the  governing  body,  asking  that  the 
measure  in  question  be  submitted  to  a  vote  of 
the  people  for  adoption  or  rejection,  said  meas- 
ure shall  not  go  into  effect  until  an  election  shall 

3^ 


DIRECT   LEGISLATION 

have  been  held  as  petitioned.  It  shall  be  the 
duty  of  the  governing  body  of  the  city  to  provide 
for  such  election  within  thirty  days  of  the  filing 
of  the  petition. 

(b)  At  such  election  the  ballot  shall  contain 
the  text  of  the  measure  in  question,  and  below 
the  same  the  phrases  ''for  the  above  measure'' 
and  ''against  the  above  measure/'  followed  by 
spaces  for  marking  with  a  cross  the  phrase  de- 
sired. If  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  are 
against  the  measure  it  shall  be  of  no  effect.  If 
a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  be  not  against  the 
measure  it  shall  go  into  effect  forthwith, 

(c)  If  a  measure  be  declared  an  emergency 
measure,  as  provided  above,  it  shall  go  into  effect 
at  07tce,  subject  to  repeal  by  an  adverse  majority 
at  the  recall  election. 

Sec.  3.  (a)  Upon  petition  of  thirty-five  per 
cent,  of  the  qualified  voters  of  the  city  any  meas- 
ure may  be  proposed  to  the  governing  body 
of  the  city  for  enactment  within  thirty  days  of 
the  time  of  filing  the  petition  containing  the 
proposed  measure.  If  the  governing  body  of 
the  city  either  fail  to  act  at  all,  act  adversely, 
or  amend  the  proposed  measure,  it  shall  be 
their  duty  to  call  an  election  within  thirty  days 

37 


APPLIED    CITY   GOVERNMENT 

for  submitting  the  measure  to  a  vote  of  the 
people. 

(b)  At  such  election  the  ballot  shall  contain 
the  proposed  measure  as  originally  submitted 
and  the  measure  as  amended,  if  amended  by  the 
governing  body  of  the  city.  After  each  of  these 
measures  there  shall  be  printed  the  words  '^for'' 
and  ''against/'  with  spaces  for  crosses  there- 
after. 

(c)  If  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  at  the  elec- 
tion are  in  favor  of  the  measure  in  its  original 
form  or  in  its  amended  form,  it  shall  be  de- 
clared in  effect  as  adopted.  If  neither  measure 
receives  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast,  neither  shall 
be  in  effect. 


THE   FORM   OP  GOVERNMENT 

THE  most  important  question  that  arises  in 
connection  with  the  preparation  of  a  city 
charter  is,  of  course,  the  one  as  to  the  form  of 
government  the  city  shall  have.  Strangely  enough, 
that  matter  has  since  the  early  days  of  American 
municipal  history  until  comparatively  recent  times 
scarcely  ever  been  considered  a  matter  of  dis- 
cussion, at  least  as  far  as  the  fundamental  char- 
acteristics of  mimicipal  organization  are  con- 
cerned. For  a  hundred  years  prior  to  1900  it  was 
an  axiomatic  starting-point  in  the  organization  of 
our  municipal  government  that  there  should  be 
a  division  of  powers  between  a  mayor  and  a  coun- 
cil, theoretically  largely  independent  of  each  other. 
Important  developments  in  municipal  govern- 
ment took  place,  it  is  true,  in  the  mean  time,  and 
both  the  spirit  and  the  legal  nature  of  local  admin- 
istration underwent  various  changes;  but  so  far 
as  this  fundamental  feature  went  it  was  almost 
an  unbroken  rule  of  all  city  charter-making  up  to 
the  beginning  of  the  present  century. 

39 


APPLIED    CITY   GOVERNMENT 

In  order  to  appreciate  and  evaluate  the  reasons 
for  this  general  principle  and  to  understand  the 
significance  of  recent  developments  in  city  organi- 
zation it  will  be  necessary  briefly  to  trace  the 
origin  and  history  of  this  time-honored  American 
municipal  tradition. 

Along  with  our  common  law  and  many  of  our 
constitutional  and  legal  principles  we  inherited,  in 
the  beginning,  the  form  of  city  government  found 
in  England  during  the  colonial  period.  This  form 
of  municipal  government  was,  briefly,  a  public  cor- 
poration endowed  with  certain  local  powers  and 
governed  by  a  single  body,  the  council,  which 
comprised  mayor,  aldermen,  and  councilors.  All 
legal  powers  of  the  corporation  were  vested  in  this 
governing  body  and  exercised  by  it.  The  mayor 
was  not  a  separate  independent  organ  even  when 
appointed  by  the  colonial  governor  for  purposes 
of  royal  control.  He  was  a  member  of  the  council, 
with  few,  if  any,  important  powers  of  local  govern- 
ment lodged  in  his  hands. 

Even  after  the  Revolution  there  was  no  im- 
mediate change  from  this  form  of  government  so 
far  as  the  relation  of  the  mayor  to  the  council  was 
concerned.  The  mayor  had  no  veto  and  was  him- 
self generally  chosen  by  the  council,  following  in 
that  respect  also  the  English  practice. 

But  near  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  sev- 
eral important  innovations  occurred  in  the  office 
of  mayor.     He  was  given  the  veto  power  over  the 

40 


THE    FORM   OF   GOVERNMENT 

acts  of  the  council,  and  in  the  second  decade  of 
the  next  century  began  to  be  elected  by  popular 
vote.  These  were  fundamental  changes  and  de- 
termined the  later  development  of  the  office  in  the 
United  States.  One  naturally  looks  for  some  con- 
vincing reason  for  a  change  so  far-reaching  in  its 
consequences. 

The  principal  reason  for  this  development,  how- 
ever, seems  merely  to  have  been  the  imitative 
tendency  of  men.  Our  federal  government  had 
been  constructed  on  the  theory  of  the  distribution 
of  executive  and  legislative  functions  among  in- 
dependent organs;  and,  as  that  was  considered  a 
proper  governmental  principle,  it  came  to  be  ap- 
plied to  city  government  as  well.  This  imitation  of 
the  federal  system  showed  itself  in  other  features 
of  the  city  governments  of  that  period,  notably  in 
the  change  from  a  single-chamber  council  to  a  bi- 
cameral body.  For  this  innovation  as  well  as  for 
the  independent  executive  there  seems  to  have 
been  no  other  reason  except  the  desire  to  imitate 
the  federal  system.  It  was  not,  therefore,  a  de- 
velopment due  to  a  failure  of  the  old  form  of  city 
government  and  an  attempt  to  remedy  its  defects 
by  a  new  system.  The  election  of  the  mayor  by 
popular  vote  was  also,  of  course,  the  expression  of 
the  spirit  of  democracy  that  swept  the  country  in 
the  first  third  of  the  last  century. 

We  had,  therefore,  almost  a  himdred  years  ago 
in  this  country  a  distinctively  American  form  of 

41 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

city  organization  based  on  the  federal  analogy. 
Not  long  after  its  firm  establishment,  however,  its 
unsatisfactory  workings  became  apparent,  and 
soon  changes  began  to  be  introduced  with  a  view 
to  remedying  the  undesirable  conditions.  It  is,  of 
course,  impossible  to  name  any  one  determinant 
cause  for  the  steady  decline  in  the  quality  of 
American  municipal  government  in  the  middle 
jfifty  years  of  the  last  century.  It  is  equally  im- 
possible to  enumerate  all  the  contributing  causes 
of  that  development.  Undue  legislative  inter- 
ference was  undoubtedly  one  factor.  The  control 
of  local  affairs  by  state  and  national  political 
parties  was  another.  The  introduction  of  the 
spoils  system,  with  the  abuse  of  the  city's  patron- 
age, was  a  very  important  factor.  The  growing 
complexity  of  municipal  problems  and  the  lack 
of  trained  men  for  the  administrative  service  were 
still  other  causes.  By  no  means  least  among  these 
contributing  causes  was  the  total  absorption  of 
public  interest  by  the  great  national  issues  in- 
volved in  the  Civil  War,  its  antecedents  and 
immediate  consequences. 

Other  causes  might  be  enumerated,  no  one  of 
which  was  without  its  detrimental  effect  on  the 
success  of  our  city  government.  But  no  one  can 
study  the  history  of  American  city  government 
without  realizing  that  one  of  the  most  important 
reasons  for  the  failtu-e  of  the  kind  of  city  govern- 
ment we  developed  as  a  result  of  following  the 

42 


THE    FORM   OF   GOVERNMENT 

federal  model  was  the  lack  of  centralization  of 
power  and  responsibility  resulting  from  the  dis- 
tribution of  local  powers  between  mayor  and 
council,  each  largely  independent,  in  theory  at 
least,  of  the  other. 

We  have  seen  that  this  distribution  of  powers 
was  adopted  on  the  unproven  assumption  that 
because  it  was  considered  a  good  device  in  the 
national  government  it  must,  therefore,  be  a  good 
device  for  local  government.  Not  only  was  this 
assumption  unproven,  but  it  was  in  fact  unprov- 
able. The  reasons  which  made  a  separation  of 
governmental  powers  desirable  in  the  national 
government,  even  if  it  be  granted  that  such  a 
separation  is  wholly  desirable  there,  do  not  apply 
to  the  case  of  local  government.  Separation  of 
power  inevitably  means  diffusion  of  responsibility, 
with  the  probability  of  delay  and  friction.  Such 
a  governmental  situation  can  be  justified,  if  at  all, 
only  by  greater  advantages  in  the  way  of  checks 
on  hasty  or  dishonest  action.  Whatever  may  be 
thought  of  the  need  of  such  checl^s  in  the  national 
government,  it  seems  clear  that  they  are  not  needed 
in  that  shape  in  the  case  of  municipal  government. 

Municipalities  are  subordinate  divisions  of  the 
state.  They  exist  for  local  purposes  and  can  af- 
fect the  life,  liberty,  and  property  of  the  individual 
only  so  far  as  sanctioned  by  the  legislature  and 
not  restrained  by  the  constitution  of  the  state. 
Dangerous  and  corrupt  mimicipal  acts  can  there- 

43 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

fore  be  prevented  by  the  check  of  the  superior 
power  of  the  state  acting  through  its  legislature, 
executive,  and  judiciary.  What  need,  therefore, 
of  checks  and  balances  within  the  city  govern- 
ment itself? 

Now,  what  have  been  the  organic  changes  that 
have  been  made  in  our  city  government  since  the 
time  when  its  defects  first  began  to  be  apparent? 
As  has  already  been  stated,  in  spite  of  all  defects 
and  in  spite  of  all  experiments  and  changes  there 
was  not  until  less  than  fifteen  years  ago  any  at- 
tempt to  give  up  the  fundamental  mayor-and- 
council  idea.  It  was  clear  that  if  anything  was 
to  be  accomplished  in  the  city  some  organ  must 
have  the  power  to  act.  An  absolutely  co-ordinate 
mayor  and  council  could  not  work,  hence  one  or 
the  other  had  to  be  the  chief  factor,  the  other 
acting  as  the  needed  check.  The  council  pos- 
sessed for  a  time  the  preponderance  of  power,  but 
gradually  more  and  more  powers  were  taken 
from  it  until  it  came  to  play  a  secondary  role. 
Not  all  of  these  powers  were,  it  is  true,  conferred 
upon  the  mayor.  Unfortunately,  still  greater  con- 
fusion was  introduced  by  creating  other  indepen- 
dent administrative  authorities,  as  will  be  noted  a 
little  later;  but,  nevertheless,  the  mayor  in  general 
gained  in  relative  importance,  and  the  tendency 
to-day  in  cities  retaining  the  mayor -and -council 
plan  seems  to  be  in  the  direction  of  still  further 
concentration  of  power  in  his  hands. 

44 


THE    FORM   OF   GOVERNMENT 

Then  all  at  once,  while  cities  were  still  wrest- 
ling with  the  unsolvable  problem  of  establishing 
satisfactory  relations  between  two  co-ordinate 
independent  municipal  authorities,  came  the  Gal- 
veston flood  and  the  resulting  commission  form 
of  government.  Every  one  is  familiar  with  the 
phenomenal  spread  of  the  commission-govern- 
ment movement  among  the  cities  of  the  United 
States.  Many  persons  have  wondered  at  what 
seemed  to  them  the  inexplicable  rapidity  of  its 
extension,  and  others  have  predicted  that  it  was 
but  a  fad  destined  to  run  its  brief  course  and  dis- 
appear. But  surely,  to  any  one  who  has  followed 
the  course  of  oiu*  municipal  development  in  this 
country,  the  commission-government  movement 
could  be  a  matter  neither  of  surprise  nor  of  dis- 
mal prophecy.  The  wonder  is  not  that  it  has 
come  and  come  to  stay,  but  that  it  was  so  long  in 
coming. 

Since  mayor  and  council  could  not  be  made  to 
work  satisfactorily  on  a  basis  of  independent 
voluntary  co-operation,  the  only  other  possibility 
was  to  do  away  with  the  independence  of  one  or 
the  other  organ.  What  more  natural  solution 
for  one  of  the  main  defects  of  our  city  govern- 
ment? And  yet  it  took  a  hundred  years  of  ex- 
perimenting to  come  to  it,  and  then  it  was  largely 
by  accident  that  the  proper  solution  was  found. 
This,  then,  is  the  principal  merit  of  the  commission 
government,  that  it  does  away  with  the  time- 

45 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

honored  system  of  checks  and  balances  in  city 
government. 

Not  only  does  commission  government  attack 
the  evils  of  the  federal  analogy  in  city  govern- 
ment by  abolishing  the  independent  co-ordinate 
executive,  but  also  in  doing  away  with  the  bicam- 
eral council  still  found  in  a  number  of  American 
cities.  There  was  in  this  feature  the  same  un- 
reasoning imitation  of  the  national  government, 
the  same  delay,  friction,  and  shifting  of  respon- 
sibility experienced  as  in  the  case  of  the  indepen- 
dent mayor.  American  cities,  it  is  true,  seem  to 
have  been  abandoning  more  and  more  in  recent 
times  the  bicameral  principle,  but  commission 
government  put  an  end  to  it  at  once  wherever 
adopted. 

Finally,  commission  government  may  be  credit- 
ed with  at  least  one  other  improvement  on  the 
old  aldermanic  form  of  city  government — namely, 
the  substitution  of  the  general  ticket  for  the  ward 
election.  ^Here  again  we  find  a  similarity  to  the 
federal  system  of  government  where  each  Congress- 
man is  charged  with  the  duty  of  looking  after  the 
material  interests  of  his  district.  The  log-rolling 
tactics  of  our  national  assembly  are  too  notorious 
to  need  any  further  mention,  and  the  fact  that 
they  have  been  faithfully  duplicated  in  our  city 
governments  is  also  a  matter  of  common  knowl- 
edge. In  fact,  so  general  were  the  abuses  arising 
from  the  idea  of  representing  wards  instead  of 

46 


THE    FORM   OF   GOVERNMENT 

the  whole  city  that  the  very  words  ''ward  poli- 
tics" have  come  to  mean  the  smallest  and  most 
despicable  kind  of  political  chicanery  and  cor- 
ruption. 

Now,  in  our  national  and  state  governments  the 
diversity  of  interests  represented  as  well  as  the 
size  of  the  constitutency  made  election  districts, 
of  course,  ijipvitable.  But  even  there  it  is  most 
unfortunate  that  representatives  in  the  general 
assembly  are  primarily  representatives  of  their 
own  districts  for  purposes  of  aggrandizement 
rather  than  deliberators  for  the  general  good. 
Such  evils  resting  on  the  undeveloped  conditions 
of  public  opinion  are  difficult  to  remedy  in  state 
and  nation  where  election  districts  must  remain. 
But  in  our  cities  the  situation  is  different.  With 
the  possible  exception  of  some  of  our  largest 
cities  there  is  not  a  sufficient  diversity  of  interests 
geographically  distributed  to  warrant  representa- 
tion on  a  geographical  basis.  The  city  being 
primarily  a  public  corporation  for  the  better  satis- 
faction of  certain  social  and  economic  needs,  it  is 
almost  always  true  that  legislation  which  benefits 
one  part  of  a  city  will  benefit  all  parts.  With  re- 
spect to  public  improvements,  furthermore,  their 
location  and  development  should  be  dictated  by 
Considerations  of  general  welfare,  not  by  the  polit- 
ical influence  of  the  representative  from  the  dis- 
trict desiring  such  improvements. 

Of  course,  election  at  large  would  not  be  feasible 
4  47 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

without  a  reduction  in  the  number  of  representa- 
tives. This,  too,  is  one  of  the  characteristic  fea- 
tures of  commission  government.  In  fact,  it  is 
the  one  from  which  it  derived  its  name  because  a 
small  body  or  commission  governed  in  place  of 
the  larger  council.  One  of  the  most  beneficial 
developments  in  American  government  in  recent 
times  has  been  the  so-called  short-ballot  move- 
ment, which  aims  to  lighten  the  burden  and  in- 
crease the  intelligent  voting  of  the  electorate  by- 
giving  them  fewer  offices  to  fill  at  one  time.  Com- 
mission government,  by  providing  for  a  small 
governing  body,  made  it  possible  to  adopt  the 
principle  of  general-ticket  election  without  vio- 
lating the  no  less  important  principle  of  the  short 
ballot. 

We  may  now  sum  up  the  general  conclusions 
we  have  reached  so  far  as  to  the  form  of  govern- 
ment desired  for  our  city.  There  should  be  a  sin- 
gle governing  body  in  whom  all  ultimate  authority 
of  the  city  should  be  vested.  This  body  should 
be  comparatively  small  and  elected  by  general 
ticket.  These  are  the  fundamental  considerations 
and  the  ones  most  in  need  of  elucidation,  not  be- 
cause of  any  obscurity  in  meaning  or  difficulty  in 
appreciation  and  application,  but  merely  because 
of  their  heretical  departure  from  what  many  in- 
telligent persons  still  regard  as  the  orthodox  doc- 
trine of  city  government.  Some  minor  points 
with  regard  to  number  of  representatives,  quali- 

48 


THE    FORM    OF    GOVERNMENT 

fications  for  office,  length  of  term,  amount  of  com- 
pensation, meetings,  procedure,  etc.,  remain  to 
be  considered  before  we  embody  these  proposals 
in  charter  form. 

With  regard  to  qualifications  there  would  seem 
to  be  no  reason  why  any  qualified  voter  should 
not  be  eligible  for  election.  With  regard  to  the 
term  of  office,  it  is  desirable  to  adopt  as  long  a 
term  as  is  consistent  with  the  responsiveness  to 
public  opinion  that  must  characterize  a  true 
representative. 

The  matter  of  the  exact  number  of  representa- 
tives that  should  be  provided  is  not  easy  to  fix 
exactly.  In  general  it  should  be  the  smallest 
number  that  can  effectively  represent  the  various 
class  interests  and  points  of  view.  Effectiveness 
of  action  diminishes  very  rapidly  with  the  increase 
in  numbers;  and,  as  various  safeguards  are  pro- 
vided in  the  charter  against  undue  disregard  of 
community  sentiment,  a  small  number  of  men  can 
be  trusted  to  represent  the  sentiments  of  the  com- 
munity as  well  as,  and  perhaps  better  than,  many 
of  the  large  city  councils  we  now  find  in  Ameri- 
can cities.  A  varying  number,  depending  on  the 
population,  should  be  provided  for,  from  a  mini- 
mum of  five  in  the  smallest  cities  to  a  maximum 
of  fifteen  in  the  largest. 

The  questions  of  salary,  number  of  meetings, 
and  duties  are  so  intimately  connected  with  the 
organization  of  the  administration  which  will  be 

49 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

discussed  in  the  next  chapter  that  it  will  not  be 
possible  to  dwell  on  them  to  any  extent  here. 
This  governing  body,  as  will  appear  in  the  next 
chapter,  is  not  to  be  charged  with  any  duties  of 
administration,  and  is  to  act  in  legislation  pri- 
marily to  ratify  or  reject  proposals  made  by  an 
official  to  be  described  hereafter.  Its  duties, 
while  extremely  important,  will  not  be  arduous 
and  will  take  but  little  time  of  its  meetings.  Hence 
meetings  need  not  be  frequent  and  no  compensa- 
tion need  be  paid. 

There  is  a  very  distinct  advantage  in  having 
members  of  the  community  serve  on  the  repre- 
sentative body  of  the  city  without  pay.  One  of 
the  most  unpicturesque  and  distinctly  harmful 
factors  in  American  politics  has  been  the  profes- 
sional office-seeker.  Usually  unable  to  make  a 
living  at  any  other  calling,  he  has  made  a  business 
of  getting  salaried  offices  for  which  he  was  unfit  at 
the  price  of  absolute  subservience  to  the  powers 
that  put  him  in.  It  would  be  undesirable  to 
limit  office-holding  to  the  wealthy  leisure  class, 
even  for  the  sake  of  getting  rid  of  the  professional 
office-seeker.  But  by  making  a  place  on  the 
city  governing  body  honorary  and  honorable,  a 
place  of  importance  and  dignity,  without  demand- 
ing an  undue  amount  of  time,  the  undesirable 
citizen  in  question  is  excluded,  while  many  de- 
sirable but  busy  men  could  be  persuaded  to  give 
the  benefit  of  their  experience  and  good  sense  in 

50 


THE    FORM   OF   GOVERNMENT 

such  an  office  without  a  financial  sacrifice  to  them- 
selves. Germany  and  England  find  it  possible 
to  enlist  the  services  of  their  best  citizens  for 
municipal  purposes  without  pay.  It  is  not  to  be 
supposed  that  a  republic  like  ours  would  be  behind 
these  monarchies  in  the  matter  of  public-spirited 
citizens. 

Finally,  it  is  important  to  provide  for  absolute 
publicity  of  all  proceedings  of  the  governing  body 
and  for  the  fullest  information  to  the  citizens  of 
what  is  going  on  in  their  city.  In  this  way  a  feel- 
ing of  responsibility  will  be  developed  and  fostered 
on  the  part  of  the  representatives,  and  a  feeling  of 
participation  and  interest  on  the  part  of  the  citizens. 

We  are  now  ready  to  embody  in  the  form  of 
charter  provisions  the  principles  which  have  been 
laid  down  and  developed  with  regard  to  the  proper 
organization  of  the  governing  body  of  the  city. 

ARTICLE  IV — THE  GOVERNING   BODY 

Sec.  I.  All  legal  powers  of  the  corporation ^ 
except  as  herein  denied  or  limited,  shall  be  vest- 
ed in  a  commission  of  five  ^  members  elected  at 
large  in  the  manner  specified  in  Article  II. 

^This  number  should  be  increased  for  larger  cities;  for  in- 
stance, an  increase  of  two  members  for  every  additional  hun- 
dred thousand  after  the  first  up  to  nine  members,  then  an 
increase  of  two  members  for  every  additional  five  hundred 
thousand  up  to  thirteen  members,  and  then  fifteen  members 
for  all  cities  above  that  number. 

51 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

Sec.  2.  One- fifth  of  the  commission  shall 
he  elected  each  year  for  a  term  of  five  years  or 
until  the  successors  are  duly  elected  and  quali- 
fied. The  order  in  number  of  votes  received  of 
the  five  successful  candidates  in  the  first  election 
shall  determine  their  length  of  service  in  their 
first  term,  the  candidate  standing  first  being  de- 
clared elected  for  five  years;  the  one  standing 
second  for  four  years,  etc.;  second  and  other 
choices  being  taken  into  consideration  to  the 
same  extent  that  they  were  in  the  election. 

Sec.  3.  Any  qualified  voter  of  the  city  shall 
be  eligible  for  election  to  the  commission. 

Sec.  4.  The  members  of  the  commission 
shall  serve  without  pay,  but  shall  be  entitled  to 
reimbursement  for  legitimate  expenses  actually 
incurred  in  the  performance  of  their  duties. 

Sec.  5.  The  commission  shall  meet  regular- 
ly once  a  month,  or  oftener  if  business  requires. 
All  meetings  shall  be  open  to  the  public  unless 
special  considerations  of  a  peculiar  nature  de- 
mand that  a  meeting  be  secret,  when  it  can  be  so 
declared  by  a  majority  of  the  commission. 
Abstracts  of  the  minutes  of  all  meetings  of  the 
commission  shall  be  printed  in  at  least  one 
daily  newspaper  of  the  city,  and  the  official 

52 


THE    FORM    OF   GOVERNMENT 

minutes  of  the  meetings  shall  be  open  to  in- 
spection at  all  convenient  times. 

Sec.  6.  The  commission  shall  choose  its 
own  chairman  annually  and  shall  determine 
its  order  of  business  and  procedure. 

Sec.  7.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  com- 
mission to  pass  all  ordinances  and  other  meas- 
ures conducive  to  the  welfare  of  the  city  and  to 
the  proper  carrying  out  of  the  provisions  of 
this  charter.  The  commission  shall  provide  all 
offices,  in  addition  to  those  herein  specified ^ 
which  may  become  necessary  for  the  proper 
carrying  on  of  the  work  of  the  city.  The  com- 
mission shall  appoint  the  chief  administrative 
officer  as  hereinafter  provided  for  and  shall 
hold  him  responsible  for  the  proper  and  efficient 
admijiistration  of  the  city  government. 

Sec.  8.  Vacancies  in  the  commission  shall 
be  filled  by  majority  choice  of  the  remaining 
commissioners  for  the  period  intervening  between 
the  occurrence  of  the  vacancy  and  the  next  regular 
election:  Provided,  that  if  such  period  be  less 
than  six  months  no  such  temporary  appointment 
shall  be  made.  At  the  next  regular  election  a 
commissioner  shall  be  chosen  for  the  remainder 
of  the  unexpired  term. 


VI 

THE   ADMINISTRATIVE    OFFICERS 

SECOND  only  in  importance  to  the  matter 
of  the  constitution  of  the  governing  body  of 
the  city  is  the  question  of  the  organization  of  the 
administration.  In  fact,  it  may  be  said  to  be  of 
equal  importance,  for  the  passing  of  proper  meas- 
ures is  of  no  avail  unless  those  measures  are  prop- 
erly executed  and  administered. 

It  is  in  the  field  of  administration  particularly 
that  American  cities  are,  as  a  rule,  in  a  most  de- 
plorable state.  The  fundamental  principles  of 
efficient  administration — namely,  expert  adminis- 
trators and  concentration  and  centralization  of 
administrative  powers — have  been  consistently 
honored  in  their  breach  in  American  municipal 
government. 

In  the  beginning  of  our  history  as  an  inde- 
pendent nation  the  problem  of  administration  was 
comparatively  simple,  for  there  was  almost  no 
municipal  administration  as  we  know  it  to-day. 
Cities  were  small,  and  even  the  primary  function 
of  preserving  the  peace  was  but  ill  attended  to. 

54 


ADMINISTRATIVE   OFFICERS 

There  was  virtually  nothing  in  the  way  of  munic- 
ipal utilities  and  the  city  budgets  were  small. 
Under  those  conditions  it  did  not,  of  course,  make 
much  difference  what  machinery  of  administra- 
tion was  provided. 

When,  however,  cities  began  to  grow  rapidly  in 
size  and  to  increase  in  even  a  greater  relative 
measure  the  scope  of  their  activities,  the  work  of 
administration  became  too  complex  to  be  suc- 
cessfully carried  on  in  an  unscientific  haphazard 
way.  Unfortunately  for  American  city  govern- 
ment, it  was  just  at  the  time  when  the  problem  of 
city  administration  was  becoming  a  difficult  one 
that  several  political  doctrines  were  introduced, 
the  effect  of  any  one  of  which  would  have  been  to 
hinder  the  development  of  proper  principles  of  ad- 
ministration, the  effect  of  all  of  which  together  was 
to  destroy  the  possibility  of  such  development 
until  such  time  as  the  evils  of  these  doctrines 
should  have  become  so  well  recognized  as  to  lead 
to  their  abandonment.  That  time,  it  may  here 
be  said,  is  not  yet. 

First  among  these  unhappy  doctrines  is  the  one 
we  have  already  considered — namely,  the  system 
of  checks  and  balances.  In  the  case  of  legislation 
the  trouble  arose  from  the  fact  that  the  indepen- 
dent veto  power  of  the  mayor  enabled  the  council 
to  blame  the  mayor  for  failure  to  pass  desired 
legislation  because  of  the  threat  of  veto,  while 
the  mayor,  on  the  other  hand,  accused  the  coimcil 

55 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

of  being  unwilling  to  enact  desirable  measures 
which  the  mayor  advocated.  In  the  case  of  the 
administration  the  trouble  arose  from  the  partici- 
pation by  the  council  in  the  appointing  power  of 
the  mayor.  Here  again  the  mayor  could  excuse 
bad  appointments  on  the  ground  that  the  council 
would  not  ratify  any  others,  while  the  council  would 
condemn  the  mayor  for  not  submitting  better 
nominations.  Thus  the  game  of  battledoor  and 
shuttlecock  could  be  played  by  the  co-ordinate 
branches  of  the  city  government  while  the  public 
paid  the  price  of  the  entertainment.  Nothing  is 
more  apparent  than  that  if  there  is  to  be  adminis- 
trative efficiency  there  must  be  first  of  all  adminis- 
trative power,  and  that  means  an  independent 
power  of  appointment  and  removal.  There  is 
here  no  room  for  checks  by  the  legislative  branch 
of  the  government.  The  necessary  safeguards 
against  abuse  of  this  power  should  and  can  be 
provided  in  other  ways,  as  will  appear  later. 

The  second  pernicious  principle  that  contributed 
to  the  demoralization  of  the  administration  was 
the  famous  Jacksonian  spoils  system.  According 
to  the  views  which  Jackson  made  popular,  it  was 
the  proper  thing  for  a  victorious  party  to  reward 
its  faithful  captains  by  the  power  of  distributing 
patronage.  Of  course,  it  was  not  part  of  the  doc- 
trine that  wholly  unfit  and  even  dishonest  men 
should  be  put  into  office  under  that  system,  but 
it  was  an  actual  and  almost  inevitable  conse- 

56 


ADMINISTRATIVE   OFFICERS 

quence  that  in  many  instances  this  should  turn 
out  to  be  the  case.  At  best  the  system  of  turning 
out  all  incumbents  of  administrative  offices  with 
a  change  of  party  could  do  no  less  than  absolutely 
insure  against  the  possibiHty  of  profiting  by  ex- 
perience by  putting  in  inexperienced  officials  at 
more  or  less  regular  intervals. 

A  third  delusion  which  received  almost  universal 
acceptance  beginning  at  about  the  same  period 
of  our  history  as  the  spoils  system  was  the  idea 
that  democracy  demanded  that  as  many  officers 
as  possible  be  elected,  and  that  to  have  adminis- 
trative officers  appointed,  especially  the  higher 
ones,  savored  of  bureaucracy  and  irresponsible 
government.  This  erroneous  notion  had  not  even 
the  merit  of  being  consistent  in  its  actual  opera- 
tion. Aside  from  the  fact  that  appointive  officers, 
if  chosen  and  removable  by  representatives  of  the 
people,  are  in  every  true  sense  responsible  to  the 
ultimate  choosers,  the  electorate,  it  is  a  matter 
of  common  knowledge  that  the  increase  in  the 
number  of  elective  offices,  which  was  thought  to 
give  more  popular  control,  in  reality  diminished 
the  possibility  of  control.  This  truth  has  so  often 
been  set  forth  in  word  and  writing  that  it  would 
be  superfluous  to  comment  upon  it  fiurther  here 
were  it  not  for  the  fact  that  it  has  by  no  means 
even  yet  received  general  acceptance.  The  abso- 
lute impossibility  of  a  voter  being  able  to  pass 
upon  the  qualifications  of  candidates  for  a  great 

57 


APPLIED    CITY   GOVERNMENT 

number  of  offices  cannot  be  a  matter  of  dispute. 
The  consequent  necessity  of  relying  on  the  judg- 
ment of  some  one  else  for  picking  out  the  proper 
candidates  seems  equally  evident.  That  that 
some  one  else  is  the  political  machine  in  control 
is  simply  a  matter  of  common  observation  appar- 
ent to  all  who  take  the  trouble  to  consider  the 
operations  of  actual  politics.  Finally,  that  the 
political  machine  does  not  truly  represent  the  will 
of  the  voters  is  proven  by  every-day  observation 
and  experience. 

Now  all  three  of  these  doctrines  have  been 
operative  for  years  to  prevent  the  attainment  of 
efficiency  in  municipal  administration.  It  would 
be  hard  to  say  which  of  them  has  had  the  most 
influence.  They  may,  however,  be  differentiated 
in  this  way — that,  while  a  growing  consciousness 
of  the  fallacy  of  the  first  two  has  resulted  in  a 
gradual  abandonment  of  their  application,  the 
third  misconception  is  still  almost  as  wide-spread 
to-day  as  it  was  a  century  or  so  ago. 

The  evils  of  a  distribution  of  the  appointive  and 
removal  power  have  led  to  a  tendency  to  concen- 
trate these  powers  in  the  hands  of  the  mayor, 
though  this  development  is  by  no  means  general 
or  complete.  The  concurrence  of  the  council  in  ap- 
pointments and  removals  is  still  required  in  a  dis- 
couraging number  of  cities,  and  the  abandonment 
of  this  practice  will  be  a  matter  of  slow  increase. 
It  has  at  least,  however,  something  of  promise. 

58 


ADMINISTRATIVE   OFFICERS 

The  spoils  system  has  been  more  successfully 
attacked  in  the  last  twenty-five  or  thirty  years. 
The  evil  effects  on  administration  of  this  doctrine 
have  led  to  the  ever-increasing  adoption  of  the 
so-called  merit  system  of  civil  service.  Beginning 
in  the  national  government  and  spreading  slowly 
to  state  and  local  governments,  this  system  has 
made  considerable  progress  in  taking  the  power  of 
official  patronage  out  of  the  hands  of  the  political 
parties.  Here,  too,  very  much  remains  to  be  done 
both  in  extending  the  application  of  the  system 
and  in  perfecting  its  workings,  but  at  least  the 
foundations  of  the  spoils  system  have  been  severely 
shaken  and  the  use  of  offices  as  political  spoils 
has  become  widely  discredited. 

Against  the  third  fallacious  doctrine — namely, 
that  of  electing  administrative  officers — the  least 
progress,  as  was  stated  above,  has  been  made. 
It  is.  true  that  in  some  cities  even  the  more  im- 
portant administrative  positions  have  been  made 
appointive.  But  it  still  remains  the  case  that  in 
general  there  is  a  strong  popular  feeling  against 
taking  the  important  administrative  offices  out 
of  the  direct  control  of  the  electorate.  With  the 
extension  of  the  principle  of  merit  appointment  in 
city  positions  it  is  not  unnatural  that  the  political- 
party  organizations  themselves  should  oppose  this 
development.  If  these  officers  are  popularly 
elected  the  political  machine  still  has  a  good 
chance  of  control.     If  they  are  appointed  under 

59 


APPLIED    CITY    GOVERNMENT 

strict  limitations  of  adequate  civil-service  regu- 
lations, all  hope  of  control  is  gone.  Opposition 
may  therefore  be  expected  from  this  quarter  for 
reasons  of  self-interest. 

But  if  we  examine  the  principle  involved  it  will 
be  perfectly  apparent  that,  on  the  one  hand,  popu- 
lar election  of  administrative  officers  cannot  result 
in  the  selection  of  men  because  of  their  relative 
expert  knowledge,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the 
electorate  can  retain  ultimate  control  and  enforce 
responsiveness  to  community  opinion  through 
their  power  of  choosing  the  persons  in  whom  the 
ultimate  contrjtl  over  appointments  is  vested. 
Administrative  posts  in  a  city  require  professional 
training  and  expert  knowledge.  The  best  adminis- 
tration for  the  city  is  the  one  that  can  furnish  the 
greatest  amount  of  skill  and  ability.  The  best 
choice  of  such  officers  from  among  various  candi- 
dates is  a  matter  of  great  difficulty,  requiring  in- 
vestigation and  comparison.  Manifestly,  the  elec- 
torate as  a  body  is  in  no  position  to  conduct  such 
an  investigation,  even  if  they  were  all  to  be  guided 
in  their  choice  by  the  professional  fitness  of  the 
applicant.  That  this  latter  supposition  would,  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  not  be  the  case  needs  no  demon- 
stration. It  is  not  only  self-evident,  but  has  been 
demonstrated  in  practice  an  untold  number  of 
times.  Furthermore,  choice  by  election  means  in 
this  country  a  limitation  of  the  field  of  choice  to 
the  locality  in  question.     Hence  at  the  very  out- 

60 


ADMINISTRATIVE   OFFICERS 

set  the  range  of  selection  would  be  so  greatly 
limited  as  to  exclude  absolutely  the  possibility  of 
considering  the  best  men  who  would  be  available 
for  all  of  the  important  positions  if  the  field  were 
not  so  limited. 

Popular  control  there  must  be  in  a  democracy; 
but  indirect  control  is  just  as  much  control  as 
direct  control  if  it  can  make  itself  felt.  Through 
the  power  of  electing  the  governing  body  of  the 
city  the  electorate  can  insure  that  the  adminis- 
trative head  chosen  by  them  will  be  responsive 
to  the  will  of  the  community  in  all  matters  that 
are  of  real  importance  or  of  general  interest.  At 
the  same  time  it  will  not  subject  the  official  whose 
primary  business  is  to  enforce  and  administer  the 
measures  enacted  by  the  representatives  of  the 
electorate  as  a  whole  to  the  political  pressure  of  a 
disgruntled  minority  who  might  make  it  a  point 
to  unite  against  the  official  in  question,  as  a  matter 
of  revenge,  at  the  next  election,  with  a  good 
chance  of  success  if  the  satisfied  majority  exhibit 
the  customary  indifference  about  rallying  actively 
to  the  support  of  an  efficient  officer.  By  having 
the  chief  administrator  chosen  by  the  governing 
body  there  is,  therefore,  insured  the  possibility  of 
a  fearless,  impartial  administration  of  the  law, 
subject  to  the  restraining  influence  of  a  popular 
control  by  the  majority  of  the  electorate. 

From  the  foregoing  considerations  we  may  now 
lay  down  the  foimdation  principles  with  regard 

6i 


APPLIED  CITY   GOVERNMENT 

to  the  organization  of  the  administrative  branch 
of  the  city  government,  so  far  as  the  relation  to 
the  governing  body  and  to  the  electorate  is  con- 
cerned. The  chief  administrative  authority  should 
be  chosen  by  and  be  subject  to  removal  by  the 
governing  body  of  the  city.  He  should  be  chosen 
because  of  administrative  qualifications  on  a  com- 
petitive basis,  without  regard  to  political  affilia- 
tions or  previous  residence.  He  should  not  be  re- 
movable for  political  reasons.  His  term  of  office 
should  be  indefinite. 

This  chief  administrative  authority  should,  of 
course,  be  a  single  individual.  No  principle  of 
administration,  public  or  private,  is  more  self- 
evident  than  that  for  effectiveness,  continuity, 
and  rapidity  of  action  a  single  individual  is  best. 
This  individual,  whom  we  may  call  city  manager 
on  the  analogy  of  his  counterpart  in  private  busi- 
ness organization,  the  general  manager,  or  mayor 
,  on  the  analogy  of  his  German  counterpart,  the 
\  burgomaster,  must  be  an  administrator  in  the 
»  broadest  sense.  He  must  not  only  have  execu- 
tive ability  in  the  narrower  sense  of  being  able  to 
organize  and  direct  the  work  of  subordinates.  He 
must  also  be  a  man  with  a  broad  grasp  of  the  real 
problems  of  city  government  and  with  construc- 
tive ideas  for  their  solution  if  he  is  to  fulfil  his 
greatest  usefulness.  The  choice  of  this  official 
will,  therefore,  be  one  of  the  most  difficult  and  im- 
portant of  the  functions  of  the  governing  body. 

62 


ADMINISTRATIVE   OFFICERS 

To  attract  a  man  of  the  highest  caHber  it  will,  of 
course,  be  necessary  to  approximate  the  salaries 
paid  to  successful  administrators  in  private  busi- 
ness, though  the  honor,  dignity,  and  importance 
of  the  position  will  no  doubt  attract  men  even 
from  more  highly  paid  positions. 

Having  provided  for  the  proper  kind  of  an  ad- 
ministrative head,  it  is  absolutely  essential  to 
endow  him  with  the  requisite  powers.  The  most 
important  administrative  powers  are  the  power 
of  organization,  the  power  of  appointment,  and  the 
power  of  removal.  These  powers  must  be  ac- 
corded to  him  in  a  generous  measure  if  he  is  to 
be  made  responsible  for  the  administration  of  the 
city.  The  power  of  organization  will  be  limited 
somewhat  by  charter  provisions,  and  will,  of 
course,  always  be  dependent  on  action  by  the 
governing  body  of  the  city.  But  the  advice  of 
the  city  manager,  or  mayor,  should  be  given  great 
weight  in  all  matters  of  organization.  The  power 
of  appointment  should  be  exercised  by  the  ad- 
ministrative head  without  interference  by  the 
governing  body,  but  safeguarded  against  abuse 
by  proper  civil-service  regulations.  The  power  of 
removal,  in  the  same  way,  must  be  left  in  his 
hands,  and  with  it  all  necessary  disciplinary  power, 
subject  to  similar  limitations. 

The  commission  form  of  city  government  has 
been  referred  to  above  as  having  introduced  im- 
provements  in   several   directions  over  the  old 

5  63 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

aldermanic  type  with  regard  to  the  composition  of 
the  governing  body  of  the  city,  and  it  is  deserving 
of  imitation  in  those  respects.  But,  unfortunate- 
ly, it  is  not  equally  meritorious  in  all  directions, 
and  it  is  just  in  this  matter  of  the  organization 
of  the  administration  that  it  shows  some  very 
fundamental  defects.  The  theory  of  commission 
government  with  regard  to  the  administrative  side 
of  the  city  is  that  each  member  of  the  governing 
body  should  be  directly  charged  with  the  manage- 
ment of  one  of  the  branches  of  administration, 
while  the  commission  as  a  whole  should  be  legally 
responsible  for  the  smooth-working  of  the  entire 
administrative  machinery. 

Now  we  can  see,  from  our  investigation  of  the 
nature  of  the  administrative  function  and  its  prop- 
er machinery,  that  there  are  two  fatal  errors  in  this 
theory.  The  one  is  the  assumption  that  laymen 
elected  by  the  people  will  be  chosen  because  of 
peculiar  fitness  for  technical  administrative  work. 
The  other  is  the  assumption  that  five  coequal  ad- 
ministrators with  no  common  superior  can  or  will 
work  in  perfect  accord  without  friction,  loss  of 
energy,  and  waste.  With  regard  to  the  first  ob- 
jection it  is  perfectly  apparent  that  when,  as  is 
usually  the  case,  the  commission  distributes  the 
departments  among  its  members  after  it  has  been 
chosen  there  is  not  even  the  possibility  of  any  ex- 
pression of  opinion  on  the  part  of  the  electorate  as 
to  the  pecuHar  fitness  of  the  candidates  for  par- 

64 


ADMINISTRATIVE   OFFICERS 

ticular  positions.  But  the  trouble  is  not  cured  by 
providing,  as  seems  to  be  becoming  more  common 
now,  that  commissioners  shall  be  elected  to  par- 
ticular administrative  posts  on  the  commission. 
The  difficulty,  as  we  have  seen,  is  that  popular 
election,  no  matter  how  well  it  may  represent  the 
wishes  of  the  electorate  in  the  matter  of  personally 
acceptable  candidates,  can  never  in  its  very  nature 
be  a  satisfactory  means  of  choosing  men  for  posi- 
tions requiring  a  high  order  of  technical  knowl- 
edge and  skill. 

The  second  defect  is  no  less  incurable.  Let 
us  suppose  that  immediately  below  the  commis- 
sioners, paid  as  they  are  to  look  after  the  depart- 
ments intrusted  to  their  care,  there  were  well- 
trained  appointive  experts  also  paid  to  look  after 
the  work  of  their  departments,  there  would  still 
be  a  lack  of  co-ordination  and  concentration. 
Every  commission  city  could  tell  a  story  of  money 
wasted,  time  ill  spent,  conflicts  of  jurisdiction, 
gaps  in  the  work  without  definite  responsibility 
because  of  the  attempt  to  divide  up  the  work  of 
the  departments.  The  truth  is  simply  that  the 
administrative  work  of  the  city  in  its  very  nature 
defies  absolute  and  consistent  separation.  A  lit- 
tle reflection  will  call  up  any  number  of  instances 
which  require  close  co-operation  between  two  or 
more  of  the  departments.  Such  co-operation  can 
be  achieved  in  one  way  only — namely,  through  a 
single  administrative  head,  one  of  whose  principal 

65 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

functions  is  just  this  difficult  matter  of  insuring 
co-ordination  and  co-operation  through  the  in- 
strumentality of  his  final  power  of  decision. 

Until  commission  government  abandons  this 
fallacious  theory  of  administrative  organization 
it  is  idle  to  hope  for  administrative  efficiency  from 
that  source. 

The  general  scheme  of  organization  for  the  ad- 
ministrative work  would  seem  to  be  dictated  by 
the  divisions  into  which  this  work  naturally  falls. 
All  activities  of  a  city  may  properly  be  classified 
under  one  of  six  heads.  There  is  the  work  of 
guarding  the  public  safety  and  furthering  the 
social  welfare  of  the  city.  There  is  the  work  of 
protecting  the  public  health.  There  is  the  pro- 
vision for  public  education.  There  is  the  work 
of  looking  after  streets  and  other  public  property 
of  the  city  and  the  municipally  operated  public 
utilities,  all  of  which  require  a  trained  engineer. 
There  is  the  legal  side  of  the  city's  activities. 
Finally,  there  is  the  important  problem  of  adminis- 
tering the  city's  finances. 

These  six  departments  should  be  supervised 
each  by  a  director  appointed  and  removable  by 
the  city  manager,  or  mayor.  Their  appointment 
and  removal  should  not  be  hampered  by  partici- 
pation of  the  governing  body.  Regulations  should 
be  provided  for  guarding  against  the  use  of  the 
appointing  power  for  unworthy  purposes  and  the 
arbitrary  and  unjust  use  of  the  power  of  removal. 

66 


ADMINISTRATIVE   OFFICERS 

But  beyond  the  essential  requirements  for  this 
purpose  the  Hmitations  cannot  be  made  to  go 
without  impairing  to  that  extent  the  efficient 
working  of  the  administrative  machine. 

A  great  deal  of  waste  is  encountered  in  city 
administration  in  the  purchase  of  supplies,  owing 
to  the  lack  of  a  purchasing  system.  The  city  as 
a  large  purchaser  should  not  only  avoid  duplica- 
tion and  loss  through  buying  different  brands  of 
an  article  needed  in  more  than  one  department, 
but  should  also  get  the  benefit  of  wholesale  prices. 
This  can  best  be  accomplished  by  means  of  a 
central  purchasing  agency  through  which  all  or- 
ders for  supplies  should  go  and  which  would  be 
responsible  for  economy  in  purchases.  The  cen- 
tral purchasing  agent  would  be  under  the  jiuis- 
diction  of  the  director  of  finances. 

In  very  small  cities  it  will  be  necessary,  for 
financial  reasons,  to  combine  several  of  these 
functions  into  one  department,  to  be  administered 
directly  and  personally,  perhaps,  by  the  city  man- 
ager, or  mayor.  In  large  cities  it  will,  of  course, 
be  necessary  to  subdivide  the  work  of  the  depart- 
ments into  bureaus  or  divisions,  with  a  chief  at 
the  head  of  each.  These  chiefs,  however,  should 
be  directly  subordinate  to  and  under  the  direction 
of  one  of  the  department  heads,  by  whom  they 
should  be  appointed  with  the  concurrence  of  the 
city  manager,  or  mayor.  The  exact  organization 
and  subdivision  of  the  departments  will,  of  course, 

67 


APPLIED    CITY    GOVERNMENT 

vary  from  city  to  city  and  should  be  provided  for 
by  the  governing  body  at  the  suggestion  of  the  city 
manager,  or  mayor. 

Certain  largely  clerical  officers,  like  the  city 
clerk,  and  judicial  officers  if  the  city  have  gen- 
eral municipal  courts  or  special  courts  like  juvenile, 
debtors',  and  domestic-relations  courts,  would,  of 
course,  not  fall  under  the  jurisdiction  of  any  de- 
partment head.  The  city  clerk  would  be  an  ap- 
pointee of  the  city  manager,  or  mayor,  but  the 
judges  and  officers  of  these  various  courts  would 
not  be  part  of  the  administrative  machinery  of  the 
city  at  all.  Their  manner  of  appointment,  re- 
moval, and  place  in  the  judicial  system  of  the 
state  would  have  to  be  determined  by  state  law. 
Suffice  it  to  say  here  that  election  should  not  be 
the  method  of  filling  any  of  these  places. 

Mention  has  several  times  heretofore  been  made 
of  the  necessity  of  putting  some  limitations  on  the 
appointing,  disciplinary,  and  removal  power  of 
the  city  manager,  or  mayor,  in  the  interests  of 
fair  play  and  non-political  administration.  These 
limitations  must,  of  course,  be  applied  through  a 
body  independent  of  the  authority  they  are  meant 
to  control.  Furthermore,  as  the  application  of 
these  limitations  is  a  matter  which  should  be  free 
from  influence  by  the  governing  body  of  the  city, 
lest  they  be  tempted  to  interfere  too  continuously 
and  minutely  in  the  details  of  administration,  the 
body  which  is  to  apply  the  limitations  in  question 

68 


ADMINISTRATIVE   OFFICERS 

should  be  as  free  from  control  as  possible  by  the 
governing  body. 

The  desired  end  can  best  be  attained,  it  would 
seem,  by  providing  for  a  civil-service  board  chosen 
for  long  terms  by  the  governing  body,  and  re- 
movable by  them  only  on  written  charges  and  a 
chance  for  a  public  hearing,  with  opportunities 
for  an  adequate  defense. 

This  civil-service  board,  whose  size  would  vary 
somewhat  with  the  size  of  the  city,  would  itself 
have  the  duty  of  developing  the  limitations  that 
should  be  imposed  on  the  administrative  acts  of 
the  city  manager,  or  mayor,  in  formal  provisions 
that  would  have  to  be  enacted  by  the  governing 
body.  An  attempt  to  enumerate  in  detail,  there- 
fore, in  a  charter  such  as  ours  the  complete  pro- 
visions of  a  civil-service  code  would  be  impossible, 
and  worse  than  useless,  even  if  possible ;  impossible 
because  the  provisions  must  vary  considerably  in 
their  details  in  various  cities,  useless  because  even 
within  a  single  city  they  should  be  subject  to 
change  by  an  easier  process  than  that  of  charter 
amendment. 

Some  of  the  leading  principles,  however,  may 
well  be  put  into  the  fundamental  law  of  the  city 
to  point  out  the  purposes  which  should  be  kept  in 
view  in  this  matter  of  limiting  the  administrative 
powers  of  the  chief  executive.  First  with  regard 
to  the  matter  of  appointment.  While  it  is  de- 
sirable that  as  much  freedom  of  choice  as  possible 

^9 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

be  left  the  city  manager,  or  mayor,  in  selecting 
his  aids  it  is  proper  to  insist  that  the  selection  be 
made  only  from  among  persons  who  have  a  cer- 
tain minimum  training  for  the  post  they  are  to 
fill,  and,  furthermore,  that  some  sort  of  test  for 
a  competitive  estimation  of  the  various  can- 
didates who  may  come  up  to  these  minimum 
requirements  shall  be  applied.  Suitable  examina- 
tions, therefore,  should  be  devised  by  the  civil- 
service  board  to  which  the  candidates  for  the 
positions  should  be  required  to  submit.  These 
examinations  must,  of  course,  be  made  as  prac- 
tical as  possible  and  test  not  only  the  book 
knowledge  of  the  candidate,  but  also  his  practical 
experience,  general  intelligence,  personal  character- 
istics, and  habits — in  short,  everything  that  might 
enter  into  the  probable  success  or  failure  of  the 
man  in  the  place.  But  even  when  all  of  these 
matters  have  been  taken  into  consideration  by 
the  civil-service  board  it  is  possible  that  out  of 
the  two  or  three  highest  candidates  picked  by 
the  board  one  might  be  peculiarly  fitted  by  ra- 
cial, religious,  or  temperamental  characteristics  to 
work  with  the  city  manager,  or  mayor.  Among 
such  candidates,  any  one  of  whom  would  be  pre- 
pared for  the  place,  the  chief  administrator  would 
be  better  able  to  pick  the  particular  one  who 
would  fit  in  the  best  than  would  a  board  whose 
work  is  not  so  intimately  connected  with  the  acts 
of  the  official  in  question.    The  board  should, 

70 


ADMINISTRATIVE   OFFICERS 

therefore,  certify  the  three  candidates  who  in 
their  estimation  are  the  best  fitted  for  the  place 
to  be  filled;  and  the  city  manager,  or  mayor, 
should  then  select  one  of  these  three,  giving  his 
reasons  for  not  choosing  the  highest  if  he  fails 
so  to  do. 

These  same  considerations  are  applicable  to  the 
filling  of  practically  all  the  inferior  positions  in 
the  city's  service,  save  for  the  employment  of 
common,  unskilled  labor.  Even  there  tests  should 
be  introduced  for  eliminating  the  physically  im- 
fit,  and  appointments  of  qualified  laborers  should 
be  in  the  order  of  application  without  regard  to 
political  affiliations. 

Somewhat  similar  limitations  should  prescribe 
the  method  of  promotion  within  the  service  on 
the  basis  of  efficiency  records,  the  transfer  of  men 
from  one  department  to  another  in  the  interests 
of  the  service,  the  grounds  for  suspension,  deduc- 
tion of  salary,  and  reprimand  and  other  discipli- 
nary measures. 

Finally  there  should  be  conditions  attached  to 
the  use  of  that  very  powerful  weapon,  the  right 
to  remove  from  office.  This  power  should  not,  of 
course,  be  invoked  except  as  an  extreme  meas- 
ure when  other  disciplinary  measures  fail.  What- 
ever the  grounds  for  removal  may  be,  there  should 
be  full  opportunity  to  be  heard  on  written  charges 
to  be  preferred  against  the  official  to  be  removed. 
An  appeal  to  the  courts  cannot  be  given  without 

71 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

seriously  impairing  the  authority  of  and  respect 
for  the  administration.  A  hearing  before  the 
civil-service  board,  with  the  possibility  in  difficult 
cases  of  another  hearing  before  the  governing 
body  of  the  city  if  sanctioned  by  the  board,  seems 
to  be  about  as  far  as  we  can  go  in  preventing  abuse 
of  the  removal  power  without  destroying  the 
sense  of  obedience  to  superiors  which  is  essential 
to  administrative  efficiency. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  incorporate  into 
our  charter  the  important  provisions  with  regard 
to  the  administrative  service  of  the  city  as  they 
have  been  developed  above. 


ARTICLE    V — THE    ADMINISTRATIVE    OFFICERS 

Sec.  I.  There  shall  he  appointed  hy  the 
commission  a  chief  administrative  officer  to  he 
known  as  mayor  {or  city  manager).  He  shall 
he  appointed  for  an  indefinite  term,  and  shall 
hold  office  until  his  death  or  resignation  or  re- 
moval hy  the  governing  hody  of  the  city. 

Sec.  2.  The  mayor  shall  he  chosen  solely  on 
the  hasis  of  administrative  qualifications ,  from 
among  all  candidates  who  apply  in  answer  to 
advertisements  inserted  in  the  leading  papers  and 
periodicals  of  the  United  States  hy  the  governing 

7? 


ADMINISTRATIVE    OFFICERS 

body  of  the  city.  The  choice  shall  not  he  limited 
by  reason  of  former  residence. 

Sec.  3.  The  mayor  shall  be  removable  at  any 
time,  upon  three  months'  notice,  by  the  govern- 
ing body.  He  may  demand  written  charges  and 
a  public  hearing  on  the  same  before  the  govern- 
ing  body  at  any  time  before  the  expiration  of 
the  three  months. 

Sec.  4.  The  mayor  shall  receive  an  ade- 
quate salary,  to  be  fixed  by  the  commission  and 
not  to  be  diminished  during  the  service  of  any 
one  incumbent. 

Sec.  5.  The  mayor  shall  be  responsible  to 
the  governing  body  of  the  city  for  the  proper  ad- 
ministration of  all  the  affairs  of  the  city;  all 
appointments  to  positions  in  the  administrative 
service  of  the  city  shall  be  made  or  confirmed  by 
hiniy  all  disciplinary  measures  shall  be  applied 
by  him,  and  all  removals  from  office  shall  be 
by  his  orders.  He  shall  exercise  all  these  powers 
subject  to  the  limitations  hereinafter  imposed. 

Sec.  6.  The  mayor  shall  prepare  and  sub- 
mit the  annual  budget.  He  shall  make  recom- 
mendations to  the  governing  body  on  all  matters 
concerning  the  welfare  of  the  city,  and  in  all 
cases,  except  when  clearly  unnecessary  or  un- 

73 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

desirable,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  governing 
body  to  request  the  opinion  of  the  mayor  on  any 
proposed  measure.  The  mayor  shall  have  a 
seaty  but  no  vote,  at  every  meeting  of  the  govern- 
ing body. 

Sec.  7.  There  shall  be  six  administrative 
departments,  as  follows:  Law,  Engineering, 
Health,  Safety  and  Welfare,  Education,  and 
Finance, 

Sec.  8.  At  the  head  of  each  department 
there  shall  be  a  director.  This  director  shall  in 
each  case  be  appointed  by  and  removed  by  the 
mayor,  under  the  limitations  hereinafter  pre- 
scribed. 

Sec.  9.  The  directors  of  departments  shall 
be  immediately  responsible  to  the  mayor  for  the 
proper  administration  of  their  departments,  and, 
except  when  clearly  unnecessary  or  undesirable, 
their  advice  shall  be  asked  by  the  mayor  as  to 
all  proposals  affecting  their  departments.  It 
shall  be  their  duty  to  make  regular  reports  con- 
cerning the  work  of  their  departments  to  the 
mayor,  and  to  furnish  him  at  all  times  with 
such  information  as  he  may  desire  concerning 
those  departments. 

Sec.  10.  There  shall  be  appointed  a  city 
74 


ADMINISTRATIVE   OFFICERS 

clerk  and  a  purchasing  agent  a?id  such  other 
officers  as  the  governing  body  of  the  city  shall 
make  provision  for  by  ordinance. 

Sec.  II.  All  appointments  to  inferior  posi- 
tions in  the  administrative  service  shall  be  upon 
recommendation  made  to  the  mayor  by  the  di- 
rectors of  the  departments  in  which  the  positions 
are  included,  under  the  limitations  hereinafter 
prescribed.  Such  administrative  positions  as 
shall  be  created  by  the  governing  body  of  the 
city,  and  do  not  naturally  fall  under  one  of  the 
six  department  directors,  shall  be  directly  subor- 
dinate to  the  mayor. 

Sec.  12.  There  shall  be  appointed  by  the 
governing  body  of  the  city  a  board  of  three 
members,  to  be  known  as  the  civil-service  board. 
They  shall  be  appointed  for  an  indefinite  term, 
at  a  salary  to  be  fixed  by  the  governing  body,  and 
shall  be  removable  by  the  appointing  body  upon 
written  charges  and  an  opportunity  for  a  public 
hearing  on  the  same. 

Sec.  13.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  this  body 
to  formulate  rules  and  regulations  for  enact- 
ment by  the  governing  body,  covering  the  limita- 
tions to  be  placed  upon  the  power  of  appoint- 
ment, discipline,  and  removal  exercised  by  the 

75 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

mayor  over  the  other  administrative  officers  of 
the  city. 

Sec.  14.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  civil- 
service  board  to  administer  the  rules  and  regula- 
tions so  enactedj  and  provision  shall  be  made  by 
the  governing  body  for  an  adequate  salary  for 
the  members  of  the  board,  as  well  as  for  sufficient 
clerical  and  technical  help  to  enable  it  to  per- 
form to  the  best  purpose  the  functions  intrusted 
to  it. 

Sec.  15.  The  rules  with  regard  to  appoint- 
ment to  office  shall  forbid  appointment  on  any 
other  grounds  than  those  of  fitness  for  the  posi- 
tion to  be  filled.  They  shall  prescribe  minimum 
technical  qualifications  for  every  position  other 
than  that  of  unskilled  laborer,  and  no  person 
who  fails  to  meet  such  minimum  requirements 
shall  be  considered  eligible  for  any  such  position. 
Tjie  rules  shall  provide,  furthermore,  for  com- 
petitive tests  adapted  to  establish  the  relative 
fitness  of  the  candidates  who  have  met  the  mini- 
mum requirements.  The  three  candidates  who 
obtain  the  highest  marks  in  such  competitive 
tests  shall  be  certified  by  the  board  to  the  mayor, 
who  must  appoint  one  of  the  three.  It  shall  be 
the  duty  of  the  mayor  to  choose  the  candidate 

76 


ADMINISTRATIVE   OFFICERS 

who  in  the  opinion  of  the  board  stands  highest 
unless  he  has  a  definite  reason  for  refusing  to 
do  so.  In  that  case  it  shall  be  his  duty  to  state 
to  the  board  said  reason. 

Sec.  1 6.  No  appointment  shall  be  made  to 
any  administrative  position  in  the  city  of  any 
person  related  to  any  member  of  the  governing 
body  or  of  the  civil-service  board,  or  to  the  mayor 
or  the  heads  of  departments,  nearer  than  the 
fourth  degree. 

Sec.  17.  Every  appointment  to  any  admin- 
istrative position  in  the  city  other  than  that 
of  mayor,  director  of  a  department,  or  member 
of  the  civil-service  board  shall  be  for  a  period  of 
six  months  in  the  first  instance.  If  at  the  end  of 
that  period  a  notification  is  sent  to  the  ap- 
pointee that  the  appointment  will  not  be  re- 
newed the  office  in  question  will  become  vacant. 
Otherwise  the  appointee  will  be  considered  as 
the  legal  incumbent  of  the  office  for  an  indefinite 
term. 

Sec.  18.  The  rules  to  be  drawn  up  by  the 
civil-service  board  for  enactment  by  the  govern- 
ing body  shall  provide  for  a  regular  system  of 
promotions  on  the  basis  of  examinations  and 
efficiency  reports;  and  the  conditions  imposed 

77 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

above  upon  appointments  shall  he  applied^  so 
far  as  practicable j  to  the  filling  of  positions  by 
promotion. 

Sec.  19.  All  appointees  shall  he  subject  to 
transfer  within  the  administrative  service  of  the 
city,  either  for  the  good  of  the  service  or  for  disci- 
plinary reasons.  But  no  one  shall  he  transferred 
to  a  position  paying  a  higher  salary  save  in 
compliance  with  the  conditions  governing  promo- 
tions, and  no  one  shall  he  transferred  to  a  posi- 
tion paying  a  lower  salary  without  being  given 
a  chance  for  a  hearing  before  the  civil-service 
hoard  on  the  charges  for  which  the  change  was 
made. 

Sec.  20.  The  civil-service  hoard  shall  classi- 
fy, so  far  as  possible,  the  acts  which  shall  he  ad- 
ministrative offenses  and  prescribe  the  penal- 
ties therefor.  The  mayor  shall  have  the  power 
to  administer  the  punishment,  hut  an  appeal 
shall  lie  to  the  civil-service  hoard  on  the  question 
of  the  commission  of  the  offense  and  the  legality 
of  the  punishment  imposed.  The  mayor  shall 
have  power  to  inflict  disciplinary  punishments 
for  other  offenses  in  office  not  specifically  men- 
tioned in  the  rules  of  the  civil-service  board,  but 
in  such  case  appeals  shall  lie  to  the  board  on 

78 


r 


ADMINISTRATIVE   OFFICERS 


the  reasonableness  oj  the  punishment  as  well 
as  on  the  question  of  the  commission  of  the  act. 

Sec.  21.  The  rules  to  be  drawn  up  by  the 
civil-service  board  shall  include  a  list  of  the 
offenses  for  which  the  mayor  may  remove  ap- 
pointees from  office.  In  every  case  there  shall 
be  provided  written  charges  to  be  submitted  to 
the  appointee  to  be  discharged,  and  an  oppor- 
tunity be  given  for  a  public  hearing  on  the 
same.  Appeal  shall  lie  to  the  civil- service  board 
on  the  question  of  the  commission  of  the  offense 
and  the  legality  of  the  punishment.  The  mayor 
shall  have  authority  to  remove  for  causes  not 
included  in  the  list  prepared  by  the  civil-service 
boardy  but  in  such  cases  appeal  shall  lie  to  the 
board  both  on  the  question  of  the  commission  of 
the  act  charged  and  on  the  reasonableness  of  the 
punishment  inflicted. 

Sec.  22.  In  no  case  shall  an  appeal  lie 
from  the  orders  of  the  mayor  or  the  decisions  of 
the  civil-service  board  to  the  regular  courts. 

Sec.  23.  All  of  the  provisions  of  this  article 
relating  to  the  regulations  to  be  drawn  up  by 
the  civil-service  board  shall,  so  far  as  possible, 
be  self-executing  and  shall  be  effective  to  that 
extent  even  without  action  by  the  board. 

6 


VII 

THE   city's   finances 

ONE  of  the  most  encouraging  developments  in 
the  matter  of  public  opinion  in  municipal 
affairs  in  recent  times  has  been  the  growing 
recognition  of  the  fact  that  city  government  is 
very  largely  a  business  proposition  and  must  be 
run  on  business  principles.  Perhaps  the  most 
convincing  argument  adduced  by  the  supporters 
of  commission  government  in  behalf  of  its  adop- 
tion has  been  the  analogy  drawn  between  the 
management  of  the  city's  affairs  by  a  commission 
and  the  management  of  the  affairs  of  a  private 
corporation  by  a  board  of  directors.  The  force 
of  this  analogy  has  won  the  support  of  many 
business  men  who  had  learned  to  look  upon  city 
government  as  politics  and  hopelessly  unbusiness- 
like. It  is  true  also  that  in  practice  commission 
government,  where  installed,  has  quite  generally 
shown  an  improvement  over  the  former  govern- 
ment in  the  matter  of  attending  to  the  business 
side  of  city  government,  and  that,  too,  in  spite  of 
the  fact  that  the  analogy  of  commission  govern- 
So 


THE   CITY'S    FINANCES 

ment  with  the  ordinary  corporate  business  organi- 
zation fails  in  its  most  essential  feature — namely, 
the  general  manager. 

But  even  in  the  newer  commission  charters  too 
little  attention  is  paid  to  provisions  intended  to 
require  the  city's  finances  to  be  run  on  principles 
comporting  with  scientific  business  management. 
The  mere  addition,  furthermore,  of  a  general 
manager  in  the  shape  of  the  mayor  provided  for 
in  this  charter  will  not  insure  the  application  of 
these  principles  unless  the  charter  clearly  insists 
upon  their  introduction.  It  would,  of  course,  not 
be  possible  to  enact  into  the  charter  all  the  details 
of  finance  procedure,  nor  would  that  be  desirable, 
since  those  details  should  be  subject  to  change  as 
occasion  demands.  But  certain  fundamental  re- 
quirements should  be  inserted  and  their  fulfilment 
be  rigorously  insisted  upon  by  the  governing  body 
of  the  city. 

Among  the  more  important  features  of  the 
city's  finances  deserving  of  mention  in  the  organic 
law  of  the  municipality  are  the  manner  of  keeping 
accounts,  the  control  of  expenditures,  the  letting 
of  contracts,  the  making  of  loans,  the  care  of  the 
funds,  the  auditing  of  the  books,  and  the  prepara- 
tion and  passage  of  the  budget. 

The  accounts  of  the  city  should  be  comprehen- 
sive, accurate,  simple,  and  open  at  all  times  to 
inspection.  Modem  methods  of  accounting  en- 
able the  city  to  determine  by  means  of  accurate 

8i 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

records  the  exact  unit  costs  of  operation  and  to 
detect  thereby  where  waste  and  inefficiency  exist. 
Summary  statements  at  monthly  periods  can  be 
made  to  show  at  a  glance  just  what  the  financial 
condition  of  the  city  is,  which  enables  the  intelli- 
gent and  interested  citizen  to  keep  posted  on  these 
important  matters  without  an  unreasonable  ex- 
penditure of  time  and  effort. 

There  must  be  a  rigid  control  of  the  expendi- 
ture of  money  to  prevent  misuse  and  diversion  of 
fimds.  No  money  should  be  available  for  any 
purpose  other  than  that  for  which  it  was  appro- 
priated, and  the  mayor  should  be  made  directly 
responsible  through  his  signature  of  warrants  for 
every  bit  of  money  disbursed  by  the  director  of 
finances.  ' 

The  letting  of  contracts  is  an  extremely  impor- 
tant but  much-neglected  feature  of  the  city's  busi- 
ness as  far  as  adequate  regulation  is  concerned. 
For  all  important  contracts — that  is,  those  in- 
volving payment  of  money  aboye  a  certain  mini- 
mum— the  basis  of  award  should  be  competitive 
bidding  to  the  lowest  responsible  bidder,  and  no 
contract  otherwise  awarded  should  be  accorded 
legal  validity.  It  should  be  the  duty  of  the 
mayor  to  make  all  necessary  examinations  before 
awarding  contracts  in  order  to  insure  the  honesty 
and  bona- fide  nature  of  the  competition. 

The  bonded  indebtedness  of  the  city  is  usually 
limited  in  two  ways.     First,  there  is  generally  a 

82 


THE   CITY'S    FINANCES 

constitutional  or  legal  limit  prescribed  by  the 
state.  Second,  there  is  frequently  a  requirement 
of  popular  referendum  for  bond  issues  within  that 
limit.  The  next  article  of  this  charter  will  con- 
tain a  requirement  of  the  latter  sort.  But  it  is 
possible  for  cities  to  evade  the  limitations  intended 
to  be  placed  on  their  borrowing  power  by  obtain- 
ing loans  without  the  issuance  of  bonds,  in  antici- 
pation of  taxes  or  otherwise.  This  should,  of 
course,  be  prohibited  if  the  desired  hmitation  is 
to  be  effective. 

Cities  have  lost  vast  sums  in  the  past  by  per- 
mitting their  financial  officers  to  obtain  the  in- 
[  terest  paid  by  banks  for  the  deposit  of  the  city 
funds.  This  should,  of  course,  be  forbidden,  and 
the  director  of  finances  should  be  charged  with  the 
duty  of  depositing  the  funds  of  the  city  in  the 
manner  which  will  insure  the  largest  returns  in 
interest  consonant  with  the  greatest  security. 

Without  a  periodical  and  thoroughgoing  audit 
of  all  the  financial  records  of  the  city  it  would  be 
impossible  to  discover  evasions  of  these  provisions 
or  to  detect  misapplication  of  the  city's  funds. 
A  complete  audit  by  a  recognized  firm  of  public 
or  municipal  accountants  should,  therefore,  be 
required  twice  a  year  in  cities  of  any  considerable 
size  and  in  every  case  at  least  once  a  year» 

Finally,  what  is  perhaps  the  most  important 
matter  of  all,  there  should  be  careful  provisions 
with  regard  to  the  budget.    The  budget  is  not 

83 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

merely  a  financial  statement;  it  is  an  exhibit  of 
all  the  activities  of  the  city  presented  in  a  way 
that  permits  of  comparison  and  study.  The  prep- 
aration of  the  budget  involves  the  determination 
of  the  governmental  and  business  policy  for  the 
ensuing  year,  and  is,  therefore,  of  vital  interest 
to  the  inhabitants  of  the  city.  It  should,  there- 
fore, be  as  scientific,  accurate,  and  comprehensible 
as  possible,  and  opportunity  for  public  examina- 
tion and  discussion  should  be  afforded  at  every 
important  stage  of  its  progress.  In  this  way  an 
expression  of  public  opinion  on  important  matters 
of  policy  may  be  obtained  before  it  is  too  late  to 
make  it  effective  for  the  ensuing  year.  In  order  to 
permit  of  a  comparative  examination  with  the 
preceding  year  the  departmental  estimates  on 
which  the  budget  should  be  based  must  show  what 
provision  was  made  in  the  previous  year  and  why 
any  change  that  is  suggested  is  desirable. 

The  above  provisions  with  regard  to  the  proper 
management  of  the  city  finances  may  now  be  in- 
serted in  our  charter  as  follows: 


ARTICLE   VI — THE  CITY  S  FINANCES 

Sec.  I.  The  city's  accounts  shall  be  kept  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  show  fully  at  all  times  the 
financial  condition  of  the  city,  and  the  hooks 
shall  he  open  to  the  public  for  inspection*     The 


THE    CITY'S    FINANCES 

mayor  shall  see  that  the  director  of  finances  has 
the  city's  accounts  kept  in  the  most  approved 
fashion,  including  all  necessary  balance-sheets y 
in  detail  and  in  summary,  revenue  and  ex- 
pense statements,  stores  accounts,  operation 
statistics,  and  other  reports  necessary  to  show 
completely  each  month  the  state  of  the  city's 
finances. 

Sec.  2.  Expenditures  shall  be  legal  only  on 
the  basis  of  appropriations  in  the  budget  and  on 
the  authority  of  warrants  issued  by  the  director 
of  finances  and  countersigned  by  the  mayor. 

Sec.  3.  Contracts  shall  be  awarded  by  the 
mayor,  only  after  bona-fide  competitive  bidding, 
to  the  lowest  responsible  bidder,  when  the 
amount  to  be  paid  by  the  city  exceeds  one  hun- 
dred dollars.  All  purchases  of  supplies  shall 
be  made  through  a  central  purchasing  agent  at 
the  lowest  obtainable  prices.  No  contract  shall 
be  valid  in  which  any  member  of  the  governing 
board,  the  mayor,  or  the  director  of  any  depart- 
ment is  directly  or  indirectly  interested. 

Sec.  4.  No  money  shall  be  borrowed  by  the 
city  save  on  the  basis  of  municipal  bonds,  duly 
issued  under  the  limitations  prescribed  by  law 
and  by  the  provisions  of  this  charter.     No  agree- 

85 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

ments  to  pay  money  shall  be  valid  when  made 
in  anticipation  of  future  revenues  of  the  city, 
except  as  provided  in  the  annual  budget. 

Sec.  5.  //  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  director 
of  finances  to  see  that  all  moneys  belonging  to 
the  city  are  deposited  with  the  responsible  bank- 
ing institution  which  shall  pay  the  highest  in- 
terest on  the  funds  so  deposited,  and  said  interest 
shall  accrue  to  the  benefit  of  the  city. 

Sec.  6.  The  pay-roll  of  the  city  shall  he 
certified  each  week  to  the  director  of  finances  by 
the  directors  of  the  departments  and  the  mayor. 
In  no  case  shall  more  than  one-twelfth  of  the 
sum  appropriated  for  any  yearly  salary  be 
available  in  any  one  month. 

Sec.  7.  The  annual  budget  shall  be  prepared 
by  the  mayor  on  the  basis  of  estimates  submit- 
ted by  the  directors  of  departments.  These  de- 
partmental estimates,  showing  the  expenses  of 
the  department  for  the  preceding  year  and  in- 
dicating wherein  increases  or  diminutions  are 
recommended  for  the  ensuing  year,  shall  be 
printed  in  one  or  more  of  the  city  newspapers 
for  two  weeks  before  preparation  by  the  mayor 
for  submission  to  the  governing  body  of  the  city. 

Printed  copies  of  these  estimates  shall  be  avail- 

86 


THE    CITY'S    FINANCES 

able  to  any  citizen  upon  request  at  the  city  hall. 
Daily  opportunities  for  hearings  of  interested 
citizens  on  these  estimates  shall  be  afforded  dur- 
ing the  period  of  two  weeks  designated  above. 
The  mayor  shall  then  make  up  the  budget  and 
submit  it  to  the  governing  body  of  the  city.  Due 
announcement  shall  be  made  of  the  day  on  which 
the  budget  is  to  be  considered  by  the  governing 
body  J  and  printed  copies  of  the  budget  as  recom- 
mended by  the  mayor  shall  be  available  for  dis- 
tribution at  the  city  hall  at  least  one  week  be- 
fore the  date  set  for  the  consideration  of  the  same. 
The  consideration  shall  be  in  open  meeting,  and 
at  least  one  day  shall  be  given,  if  desired,  to 
hearing  protests  and  objections,  oral  or  written, 
to  any  items  in  the  budget  or  to  omissions 
therefrom.  The  chairman  of  the  governing 
body  shall  see  that  the  time  allowed  for  these 
public  objections  be  as  equitably  divided  among 
those  desiring  to  be  heard  as  may  be  possible. 


VIII 

THE   ISSUANCE   OF   BONDS   AND  THE   GRANTING   OF 
FRANCHISES 

IN  the  chapter  dealing  with  the  matter  of  direct 
legislation  it  was  seen  that  these  instruments 
of  popular  control  are  rightly  to  be  regarded  as 
emergency  measures,  to  be  used  only  as  weapons 
for  insuring  responsiveness  on  the  part  of  elected 
officials  to  the  will  of  the  electorate.  In  ordinary 
cases  there  is  no  great  danger  to  be  feared  from 
letting  popular  control  manifest  itself  through 
the  normal  channels — viz.,  the  choice  of  repre- 
sentatives who  do  represent.  If  the  governing 
body  of  the  city  passes  an  automobile  ordinance 
which  is  distasteful  to  the  majority  of  the  com- 
munity, no  irreparable  harm  is  done  by  letting 
the  ordinance  stand  until  the  voters  can  choose 
representatives  who  will  repeal  the  obnoxious 
measure.  The  same  thing  would  be  true  of  the 
great  body  of  ordinances  which  city  legislatures 
enact.  Remedy  by  subsequent  repeal  is  suffi- 
ciently practicable  to  obviate  the  necessity  of 
replacing  representative  government  by  direct 
government. 

38 


BONDS    AND    FRANCHISES 

But  there  are  some  cases  in  which  this  remedy 
by  repeal  is  inadequate,  and  the  public  must  be 
protected,  if  at  all,  by  having  a  chance  to  prevent 
the  passage  of  undesirable  measures — measures 
which  cannot  be  repealed  by  subsequent  governing 
bodies.  This  is  particularly  true  of  the  issuance 
of  municipal  bonds  and  of  the  granting  of  public- 
utility  franchises.  If  an  unresponsive  governing 
body  has  the  sole  power  of  passing  such  measures 
it  is  no  protection  to  the  electorate  to  choose 
other  representatives  at  subsequent  elections,  or 
even  to  resort  to  the  recall.  A  bond  issue  once 
duly  passed  or  a  franchise  once  legally  granted 
binds  subsequent  governing  bodies  and  precludes 
the  possibility  of  repeal.  Hence  we  conclude  that 
in  these  two  cases  there  should  be  an  obligatory 
referendum  to  insure  the  opportunity  to  the  peo- 
ple affected  to  prevent  the  passage  of  such  in- 
curable measures.  For  that  reason  it  seems  logi- 
cal to  place  the  provisions  with  regard  to  bond 
issues  and  grants  of  franchise  in  the  same  article 
of  the  proposed  charter. 

Municipal  bond  issues  and  municipal  franchise 
grants  have  still  another  important  characteris- 
tic in  common.  It  is  not  merely  the  electorate 
of  to-day  that  is  affected  by  such  measures,  and 
that  should,  therefore,  have  a  voice  in  their  con- 
sideration and  passage.  If  the  borrowing-power  is 
to  be  of  aay  value  to  a  city  it  must  be  able  to 
borrow  money  for  relatively  long  periods  of  time. 

89 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

If  franchises  for  public  utilities  are  to  be  worth 
anything  to  capitalists  they  must  also  extend  over 
a  comparatively  long  period  of  time.  Therefore 
persons  who  have  no  voice  in  the  issuance  of  the 
bonds  or  in  the  granting  of  the  franchise  will  have 
to  pay  taxes  on  those  bonds  and  will  have  to  sub- 
mit to  the  conditions  of  those  franchises.  Some 
guarantees  must,  therefore,  be  provided  to  protect 
future  citizens  against  unbearable  burdens  in 
these  regards. 

With  regard  to  bond  issues  there  are  a  few  fun- 
damental considerations  to  be  kept  in  mind.  In 
the  first  place,  bonds  should  never  be  issued  for 
the  payment  of  current  expenses,  but  only  for 
the  provision  of  permanent  improvements.  The 
life  of  the  bond  should  be  determined  by  the  life 
of  the  permanent  improvement  to  be  paid  for  out 
of  the  bond  issue.  It  is  not  unfair  to  distribute 
the  cost  of  an  improvement  among  those  who 
benefit  therefrom,  even  though  they  may  not  all 
have  had  any  voice  in  determining  upon  the  under- 
taking of  the  improvement.  But  it  is  unfair  to 
charge  subsequent  taxpayers  with  the  burden  of 
paying  for  an  improvement  which  has  disappeared 
and  from  which  they  derive  no  manner  of  benefit. 
In  the  second  place,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that 
new  public  improvements  are  continually  becom- 
ing necessary,  and  that  if  the  undertakings  en- 
tered upon  during  a  comparatively  brief  period 
involve  the  city  too  heavily  in  debt  it  will  be 

90 


BONDS    AND    FRANCHISES 

impossible  for  subsequent  citizens  to  provide  for 
improvements  which  may  have  become  impera- 
tive. A  Hmitation  on  the  total  bonded  indebt- 
edness at  any  given  time  must,  therefore,  be 
imposed. 

In  the  same  way  with  regard  to  public-utility 
franchises.  Though  it  is  inevitable  that  a  given 
body  of  citizens  have  the  power  to  bind  their  suc- 
cessors to  a  certain  extent  in  the  matter  of  fran- 
chise privileges,  it  is  neither  inevitable  nor  proper 
that  the  subsequent  citizens  should  be  wholly  at 
the  mercy  of  corporations  operating  under  previous 
franchises.  To  prevent  this  it  is  necessary  to  in- 
sert in  the  charter  itself  prohibitions  against  per- 
petual and  long-time  franchises  and  to  secure  to 
the  city  adequate  continuing  power  of  regulation 
and  control,  no  matter  what  the  provisions  of  the 
franchise.  Public-utility  corporations  are  always 
provided  with  the  best  legal  counsel  to  insure  their 
getting  the  most  advantageous  terms.  The  public 
is,  as  a  rule,  without  the  same  adequate  protec- 
tion, and  must,  therefore,  be  protected  by  the 
charter  itself.  Furthermore,  with  the  growing 
tendency  toward  municipalization  of  public  utili- 
ties it  is  essential  to  reserve  to  the  city  the  right 
to  take  over  under  equitable  arrangements  any 
public  utility  operated  under  a. franchise. 

These  ends  with  regard  to  franchise  rights  are 
best  obtained  by  providing  indeterminate  terms, 
with  adequate  means  of  investigation  and  super- 

91 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

vision  by  the  city,  and  the  possibiHty  of  buying 
at  the  expiration  of  stated  intervals  the  plant  of 
the  corporation.  Indeterminate  franchises  are 
better  than  franchises  for  definite  terms,  because 
of  the  tendency  of  corporations  to  permit  deprecia- 
tion and  inadequate  service  toward  the  expiration 
of  the  franchise  period.  Control  over  the  issuance 
of  stock  and  complete  power  of  inspection  must 
be  insured  in  order  to  enable  the  city  to  prescribe 
reasonable  rates  and  to  have  a  fair  basis  for  esti- 
mating the  value  of  the  plant  in  case  of  purchase 
by  the  city. 

These  necessary  safeguards  in  the  matter  of 
bond  issues  and  public-utility  franchises  may  be 
briefly  stated  in  our  charter  as  follows : 

ARTICLE    VII — BOND    ISSUES    AND    MUNICIPAL 
FRANCHISES 

Sec.  I.  Every  issue  of  bonds  authorized  hy 
the  governing  body  of  the  city,  under  the  limita- 
tions herein  prescribed,  and  every  grant  of  a 
franchise  for  the  operation  of  a  public  utility, 
under  the  following  limitations,  shall,  before 
becoming  effective,  be  submitted  to  a  vote  of  the 
people  for  ratification.  Such  ratification  shall 
occur  at  a  special  election  held  for  that  purpose 
unless  a  regular  election  occurs  within  ninety 

92 


BONDS   AND    FRANCHISES 

days  of  the  date  of  passing  the  resolution  au- 
thorizing the  bond  issue  or  the  granting  of  the 
franchise,  in  which  case  the  question  shall  be 
submitted  at  such  election.  In  either  case  a  ma- 
jority of  the  votes  cast  on  the  question  shall  be 
necessary  and  sufficient  to  make  the  proposed 
measure  effective. 

Sec.  2.  Bonds  shall  be  issuable  only  for 
permanent  improvements,  never  for  the  pay- 
ment of  current  expenses.  They  shall  be  issued 
for  a  term  of  years  not  to  exceed  the  probable 
period  of  utility  of  the  improvement  for  which 
they  were  issued,  and  in  any  case  not  over  fifty 
years. 

Sec.  3.  The  bonded  indebtedness  of  the  city 
shall  never  exceed  ten  per  cent,  of  the  assessed 
valuation  of  the  taxable  property  within  the  city. 
But  bonds  may  be  issued  for  the  purchase  or 
construction  of  income-bearing  public  utilities 
beyond  this  limit  if  they  are  expressly  made 
chargeable  only  against  the  property  employed 
for  such  utilities  and  not  against  the  city. 

Sec.  4.  Public-utility  franchises  shall  be 
granted  only  for  indeterminate  terms,  reserving 
to  the  city  the  right  to  terminate  the  franchise  and 
to  purchase  at  a  fair  value  the  property  of  the 

93 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

utility  at  the  end  of  the  first  ten  years  and  at 
the  termination  of  every  five-year  period  there- 
after. The  purchase  price  shall  be  determined 
by  a  board  of  valuation  of  five  members,  two  to 
be  chosen  by  the  owners  of  the  utility,  two  by  the 
governing  body  of  the  city,  and  the  fifth,  who  is 
to  be  neither  a  resident  of  the  city  nor  himself 
interested  financially  in  any  public  utility,  shall 
be  designated  by  the  governor  of  the  state.  In 
computing  the  price  to  be  paid  no  monopoly  nor 
franchise  value  shall  be  taken  into  consideration. 
Sec.  5.  All  franchises  shall  be  granted  sub- 
ject to  the  right  of  the  city,  whether  expressly 
stated  or  not,  to  make  all  reasonable  regulations 
concerning  the  capitalization,  service,  and  rates 
of  the  corporation  or  other  body  to  which  the 
franchise  is  granted,  subject,  furthermore,  to  the 
city's  power  to  inspect  the  books  of  the  owner  of 
the  utility  at  all  times.  The  city  shall  require 
accounts  to  be  so  kept  by  the  owner  of  the  utility 
that  they  will  clearly  show  how  the  finances  are 
run  and  whether  the  franchise  requirements  as 
to  sinking-fund,  depreciation  fund,  improve- 
ments, and  capitalization  are  complied  with. 
The  enforcement  of  these  provisions  shall  be  in 
the  immediate  charge  of  the  director  of  finances. 


IX 

,  CONCLUSION 

I 

THE  foregoing  presentation  includes  a  consid- 
eration of  those  matters  which  seem  to  be  of 
fundamental  importance  in  the  preparation  of  an 
organic  law  for  the  city.  There  are  other  mat- 
ters of  perhaps  equal  importance  to  the  city  which 
have  not  been  dealt  with  in  the  charter  for  the 
reason  that,  although  important,  they  are  of  a 
nature  to  be  treated  by  ordinance  rather  than  by 
charter  provision.  It  is  not  unlikely  that  on  this 
question  a  fair  difference  of  opinion  will  exist.  It 
is,  therefore,  perhaps  safer  to  say  that  at  least  all 
of  the  provisions  found  in  the  foregoing  charter 
should  be  embodied  in  any  city  charter,  for  the 
danger  of  adding  too  much,  while  more  tempting, 
is  likely  to  be  less  serious  in  consequences  than  the 
danger  of  omitting  matters  of  prime  importance. 

One  matter  that  will  usually  have  to  be  dealt 
with  in  an  actual  charter,  but  which  is  not  touched 
upon  here,  is  the  manner  of  transition  from  an 
existing  form  of  city  government  to  this  proposed 
form.  This  will  usually  involve  a  temporary 
7  95 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

continuation  of  existing  arrangements  until  the 
provisions  of  the  new  charter  can  be  put  fully  into 
effect.  But  even  if  that  matter  is  not  determined 
by  state  law  the  details  of  the  transition  process 
will  be  so  greatly  determined  by  the  circumstances 
of  each  individual  city  that  there  is  scarcely  any 
benefit  to  be  derived  from  attempting  to  draft  a 
model  for  such  provisions. 

This  whole  undertaking  being  intended  to  aid 
in  the  solution  of  a  very  practical  and  difficult 
problem,  it  is  hoped  that  the  author  may  receive 
the  benefit  of  the  experience  of  charter-makers  into 
whose  hands  this  little  book  may  fall,  and  who 
may  find  unanswered  therein  some  of  the  most 
difficult  questions  with  which  they  may  be  con- 
fronted. It  is  only  in  this  way,  indeed,  that  the 
work  herein  attempted  can  hope  to  have  ulti- 
mately the  value  which  it  was  thought  capable  of 
attaining. 


A  SELECTED  LIST  OF  REFERENCES  ON  AMERICAN 
CITY  GOVERNMENT^ 


GENERAL  WORKS  ON  AMERICAN  CITY  GOVERNMENT 

Efficiency  in  City  Government  (American  Academy  of  Politi- 
cal and  Social  Science,  Philadelphia,  19 12),  $1.00. 

Beard,  Charles  A.,  American  City  Government  (The  Century 
Company,  New  York,  19 12),  $2.cx). 

CoNKLiNG,  Alfred  R.,  City  Government  in  the  United  States 
(D.  Appleton  &  Co.,  New  York,  1894),  $1.00. 

Deming,  Horace  E.,  The  Government  of  American  Cities 
(G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons,  New  York  and  London,  1909), 
$1.50. 

Fairlie,  John  A.,  Essays  in  Municipal  Administration  (The 
Macmillan  Company,  New  York,  1908),  $2.50. 

Fatrlie,  John  A.,  Municipal  Administration  (The  Macmil- 
lan Company,  New  York,  1901),  $3.00. 

Goodnow,  Frank  J.,  City  Government  in  the  United  States 
(The  Century  Compary,  New  York,  1910),  $1.25. 

Goodnow,  Frank  J.,  Municipal  Government  (The  Century 
Company,  New  York,  19 10),  $3.00. 

HoDDER,  Alfred,  A  Fight  for  the  City  (The  Macmillan  Com- 
pany, New  York,  1903),  $1.50. 

Howe,  Frederick  C,  The  City:  the  Hope  of  Democracy 
(Charles  Scribner's  Sons,  191 2),  $1.50. 

*This  list  is  intended  primarily  for  the  general  reader  who 
wishes  to  increase  his  acquaintance  with  the  literature  of  the 
subject. 

97 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 

MuNRO,  William  B.,  The  Government  of  American  Cities 
(The  Macmillan  Company,  New  York,  19 12),  $2.25. 

RowE,  L.  S.,  Problems  of  City  Government  (D.  Appleton  & 
Co.,  New  York,  1908),  $1.50. 

Weber,  A.  F.,  The  Growth  of  Cities  (Columbia  University 
Studies  in  History,  Economics,  and  Public  Law,  Vol. 
XI.,  New  York,  1 898-1 899),  $3.50. 

Wilcox,  Delos  F.,  The  American  City:  a  Problem  in  Democ- 
racy (The  Macmillan  Company,  New  York,  1904),  $1.25. 

Wilcox,  Delos  F.,  Great  Cities  in  America  (The  Macmillan 
Company,  New  York,  191  o),  $1.25. 

Wilcox,  Delos  F.,  The  Study  of  City  Government  (The 
Macmillan  Company,  New  York,  1897),  $1.50. 

Zueblin,  Charles,  American  Municipal  Progress  (The  Mac- 
millan Company,  New  York,  1902),  $1.25. 


II 

commission  government 
A.  Books 

Commission  Government  and  the  City  Manager  Plan  (The 
Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social 
Science,  Philadelphia,  1914),  $1.00. 

Beard,  Charles  A.,  Editor,  Digest  of  Short  Ballot  Charters 

(National  Short  Ballot  Organization,  New  York),  $5.cx). 

y^  Bradford,  Ernest  S.,  Commission  Government  in  American 

Cities   (The  Macmillan  Company,   New   York,   191 1), 

$1.25. 

Bruere,  Henry,  The  New  City  Government  (Appleton  &  Co., 
^  New  York,  1912),  $1.50. 

Hamilton,  John  J.,  Government  by  Commission  (third  edition, 
Funk  &  Wagnalls  Co.,  New  York  and  London,  191 1), 
50c. 
V-  MacGregor,  Ford  H.,  City  Government  by  Commission  (Bul- 
letin of  the  University  of  Wisconsin,  No.  423.  Madi- 
son, Wisconsin,  April,  191 1),    40c. 

98 


SELECTED  LIST  OF  REFERENCES 

Woodruff,  Clinton  Rogers,  City  Government  by  Commission 
(National  Municipal  League  Series,  191 1),  $1.50. 

B.  Articles  in  Periodicals 

Fancher,  F.  W.,  "Two  Epoch-making  Campaigns  in  Day- 
ton, Ohio"  {American  City,  July,  19 13). 

Fuller,  A.  M.,  "Commission  Government  for  all  Third 
Class  Cities  of  Pennsylvania"  {American  City,  August, 

1913)- 
Gilbertson,  H.  S.,  "Serious  WeaJfliesses  of  the  Commission 

Plan"  {American  City,  September,  1913). 
Ryan,  "Salt  Lake  City:  A  Municipal  Democracy"  {Harper's 

Weekly,  October  4,  19 13). 

"Commission  Government  in  Jersey  City"  {Literary  Digest, 

April  26,  1913). 
"Commission  Grovernment  of  a  Canadian  City"  {Outlook, 

September  27,  1913). 
"Commission  Government  for  the  Public  Health"  {World's 

Work,  March,  19 14). 
"Showing  the  Jobholder  to  the  Door"  {Collier's,  May  17, 

1913). 


Ill 

MATERIAL  ON  THE  CITY-MANAGER  PLAN 

A.  Books  and  Pamphlets 

City-Manager    Plan    of   Municipal   Government,    The    (The 

National  Short  Ballot  Organization,  New  York,  May, 

1914),  25c. 
Commission  Government  and  the  City -Manager  Plan   (The 

Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social 

Science,  Philadelphia,  1914),  $1.00. 
James,  Herman  G.,  A  Model  Charter  for  Texas  Cities  (second 

edition,  Bulletin  of  the  University  of  Texas,  No.  320, 

March  i,  1914). 

99 


APPLIED   CITY   GOVERNMENT 


f  B.  Articles  in  Periodicals 

Bradford,  E.  S.,  Gilbertson,  H.  S.,  "Commission  Form 

versus   City-Manager  Plan"  {American  City,  January, 

1914). 
Embrey,  a.  T.,  "How  a  Little  City  is  Progressing  Under  a 

City  Commission:  Fredericksburg,  Virginia"  {American 

City,  July,   1913). 
HoLSiNGER,  S.  D.,  "General  Manager  Plan  of  Government  of 

Houston,  Virginia." 
James,   Herman   G.,   "Defects   in  the   Dayton   Charter" 

{National  Municipal  Review,  January,  19 14). 
Marcossom,  "Business-managing  a  City"  {Collier's,  January 

3,  1914). 

Renwick,  W.  W.,  "Democracy  Chooses  an  Autocrat" 
{Technical  World,  March,  1914). 

Riddle,  K.,  "Town  Manager  as  City  Engineer"  {American 
City,  December,  19 13). 

Upson,  L.  D.,  "City-Manager  Plan  of  Government  for  Day- 
ton, The"  {National  Municipal  Review,  October,  19 13). 

"City-Manager  Plan"  {Outlook,  August  23,  1913). 

"Coming  of  the  City-Manager  Plan,  The"  {National  Munici- 
pal Review,  January,  19 14). 

"Dayton's  Step  Forward  in  City  Government"  {World^s 
Work,  October,  1913). 

"Dayton's  Unique  Charter'*   {Literary  Digest,  August  30, 

1913)- 
"Driving  PoHtics  Out  of  Dayton"  {Literary  Digest,  January 

24,  1913). 
"Practical  Short  Ballot  in  Sumter"  {Outlook,  May  10, 1913). 
"Progress    of    Simpler    Municipal    Government"    {World's 

Work,  June,  19 13). 
"Progress  of  the  City-Manager  Plan"  {Review  of  Reviews, 

February,   19 14). 


INDEX 


Accountants,  public,  83. 

Accounts,  city,  keeping,  81,  84; 
open  for  inspection,  84. 

Administration,  organization,  2, 
54»  55,  62,  64,  66;  efficiency, 
58;   non-political,  68. 

Administrative  departments, 66, 

67,  74- 

Administrative  officers,  2,  3; 
electing,  59,  60,  64,  65,  72-79. 

Amendments,  home-rule  6;  to, 
city  charter,  31. 

Appeal,  to  civil-service  board, 
72,  78;  to  regular  courts,  71, 
72, 79;  to  governing  body,  72. 

Appointments  to  office,  56,  57, 
58,  59,  63,  66,  68,  69,  70,  71, 
75,  76,  77. 

Articles  on  commission  gov- 
ernment, 99. 

Articles  on  the  city-manager 
plan,  100. 

Audit,  periodical,  83. 


partisan,  11,  13;  preferen- 
tial, 13,  15,  16,  17,  20;  de- 
fective, 13,  14;  sample,  16; 
marking,  16, 17, 23,  24;  count- 
ing, 17,  20,  24;  shortening, 
18,  48;  alphabetical  arrange- 
ment, 20,  21;  printing,  22, 
23;  recounting,  24;  recall, 
35;   special,  35,  36,  37,  38. 

Bidding,  competitive,  82,  85. 

Board  of  Valuation,  94. 

Bonded  indebtedness,  limita- 
tion, 91,  93. 

Bond  issues,  municipal,  32,  83, 
85,  89,  90,  92,  93- 

Books,  auditing,  81,  84,  85; 
power  to  inspect,  92,  94; 
on  commission  government, 
98,  99;  on  the  city-manager 
plan,  99. 

Borrowing  -  power,    limitations, 

83,  85,  89,  91,  93. 

Budget,  annual,  55,  73,  81,  83, 

84,  86,  87. 


Q  Candidates,    independent,    11; 

excess,  12,  22. 
Ballot,     official,     9,     11,     12;   Charges,  written,  71,  79. 
form,  12,  13,  20,  22,  23;  non-   Charter  provisions:  Article  I— 
lOI 


A  PPL  I  E  D   tintY  <50VERNMENT 


Incorporation  and  Power,  7; 
Article  II — The  Electorate, 
21-25;  Article  III— The  Re- 
call and  Direct  Legislation, 
35-38;  Article  IV— The  Gov- 
erning Body,  51-53;  Article 
V — The  Administrative  Offi- 
cers, 72-79;  Article  VI — 
The  City's  Finances,  84-87; 


qualifications  for  office,  49, 
52;  length  of  term,  49,  52; 
compensation,  49,  50,  51,  52; 
meetings,  49,  52;  duties,  50, 
53;  publicity  of  proceedings, 
51,  52;  appointments,  53, 
72,75;  vacancies,  53;  elected 
to  particular  posts,  65;  ap- 
peal to,  72. 


Article     VII — Bond     Issues   Commission-government  move- 


and    Municipal    Franchises, 

92-94. 
Checks  and  balances,  system, 

44»  55,  56. 
Citizens,  public-spirited,   51. 
Citizenship,  United  States,  8. 
City  charter,  preparing,  i,  3,  4, 

6,  39;    amendment,  31. 
City  clerk,  appointee,  68,  74, 

75.      . 


ment,  45,  46,  48;  form  of 
government,  45-51;  the  gov- 
erning body,  51-53;  the  ad- 
ministrative officers,  54-79; 
theory  of,  64;  purchasing 
system,  67;  city  courts,  68; 
civil-service  board,  69,  70, 
71,  72;  finances,  80-87;  is- 
suance of  bonds  and  grant- 
ing of  franchises,  88-94. 


City  funds,   deposits,   83,   86;  Constitutional  amendments,  4, 

misapplication,  83.  6. 

City  manager,  chosen  by  gov-  Contracts,    awarding,    81,    85; 

eming  body,  53,  61,  62,  72;       competitive  bidding,  82,  85. 

executive    ability,     62,     72;  Conventions,  party,  9,  10. 

term  of  office,  62,  73;  salary.  Corporations,   private,   surren- 

63»  73;    powers,  63,  66,  68,       der  to,  33. 

73;     appointments,    66,    68,  Council,  city,  division  of  power, 

69,  70,  71;   and  annual  bud-       39,  40,   43,  44,   45;    single- 
get,  73.  chamber,  41;    bicameral,  41, 
City  patronage,  abuse,  42.  46;    concurrence  in  appoint- 
Civil-service  board,  system,  59,       ments  and  removals,  58. 

60;  regulations,  60,  63;  code,  Court  officers,  appointments,  68. 

69;     appointments,    69,    75;  Courts,  appeal  to,  71,  72,  79. 

tests,  70,  71;   duties,  70,  71, 

75,  76,  78,  79;    hearing  be-  D 

fore,  72,  78,  79;    salary,  75; 

term,  75;  clerical  help,  76.  Debtor's  Court,  68. 

Commissioners,  number  of  rep-  Democracy,  direct,  31;    pure, 

resentatives,     48,     49,     51;       33;  control,  61. 
102 


INDEX 

Deposits  of  city  funds,  83.  Finances,  city,  2,  80-87. 

Direct  legislation,   30,   31,   33,  Franchises,  public-utility,  grant- 

35.  36-38,  88.  ing,  3,  32,  89,  90;  perpetual, 

Directors   of   departments,   66,  91;     indeterminate,    91,    92, 

74.  93;      municipalization,     91; 

Disciplinary  measures,  71,  78,  stock  control,  92;    power  of 

79.  inspection,  92,  94. 

Domestic-relations  Court,  68.  Funds,  care  of,  81. 


Education  Department,  66,  74.    General  assembly,  47. 
Election,  violation  of  laws,  8;   Government,    city,    principles, 
recall,  29,  35,  36,  37;  special,       vii,    viii;   preparing  charter, 


36;  district,  47;  eligible  for, 
49. 

Elections,  time,  12,  13;  place, 
13;  unfair,  13,  14;  minority, 
15;  majority,  15,  18;  pre- 
venting fraud,  24;  polling- 
places,  13,  25;  for  city  offi- 
cers, 25;  rules  and  regula- 
tions, 25;  recall,  28,  29,  35, 
36;  special,  36,  37,  38;  ward, 
46,  47;   poptilar,  65. 

Elective  officers,  right  to  vote 
for,  21,  22. 

Electorate,  the,  2,  9,  21-25,  48. 

Emergency  measure,  36,  37,  38. 

Engineering    Department,    66, 

74. 

Estimates,    departmental,    84, 

86,  87. 
European  legislatures,  6. 
Expenditures,    control    of,    81, 

82,  85. 


Finance    Department,  66,  67, 

74t  8i»  85. 

103 


i»  4»  6,  39;  representative, 
34;  division  of  power,  39, 
40,  43,  44,  45;  development 
in,  39»  40,  41,  42;  during 
colonial  period,  40;  later  de- 
velopments, 40,  41,  42;  de- 
cline in  quality,  42;  patron- 
age, 42;  organic  changes,  44; 
mayor-and-council  idea,  44, 
45;  checks  and  balances,  44, 
55,  56;  introduction  of  spoils 
system,  42,  56,  57,  59;  dis- 
tribution of  powers,  43;  com- 
mission -  government  move- 
ment, 45,  46,  48;  ward  elec- 
tions, 46,  47;  short-ballot 
movement,  48 ;  governing 
body,  48-53 ;  organization 
of  administration,  54,  55; 
budget,  55,  73,  83,  84,  86, 
87;  independent  veto  power, 
55;  distribution  of  patron- 
age, 56;  appointive  officers, 
57»  75  i  political  machine,  58; 
civil-service  system,  59,  60, 
63;    election  of  administra- 


APPLIED    CITY   GOVERNMENT 


tive  officers,  59,  60,  64,  65,  L 

72-79;     chief   administrator, 

61,  62,  63,  72,  73;   adminis-  Labor,     employment     of     un- 
trative  departments,  66,  74;       skilled,  71,  76. 

purchasing  system,  67;  city  Law  department,  66,  74. 

courts,     68;      appointments,  Legislation,  direct,  30,  31,  33, 
68,  69,  75,  76,  77;    limiting       35,  36-38,  88. 

powers    of    chief    executive,  Legislative  caucus,  9. 

68,  69,  70,  71;    civil-service  Legislatures,  state,  5,  6;  Euro- 
board,   69,    70,   76,    78;    re-       pean,  6. 

moval  from  office,  71,  72,  73,  Loans,  making,  81,  83. 

79;  employment  of  labor,  71,  Local-option  laws,  32. 
76;    promotions,  71,  77,  78; 
departmental    transfers,    71,  1^1 

78;    finances,  80,  81,  84-87; 

letting  of  contracts,  82,  85;  Mayor,  division  of  power,  39, 
bond  issues,  83,  85,  89,  90,       40,  43,  44,  45;    independent 


91,  92,  93;   deposit  of  funds, 
83,    86;     granting    of    fran- 
chises, 89,  90,  91,  92,  94. 
Governmental  powers,   separa- 
tion, 43. 

H 

Health  Department,  66,  74. 
Home-rule  charter  powers,  vii. 


Impeachment  process,  26. 
Incorporation  and  power,  5-7. 
Indebtedness,  power  to  incur, 

3;  bonded,  82,  83,  85. 
Indeterminate  terms,  91,  93. 
Initiative,  the,  2,  31,  34. 


Judges,  appointment,  68. 
Juvenile  Courts,  68. 


veto  power,  40,  55;  elected 
by  popular  vote,  41;  ap- 
pointments, 56,  58;  power  of 
removal,  58,  63,  66,  68,  73, 
79;  chosen  by  governing 
body,  53,  61,  62,  72;  execu- 
tive ability,  62,  72;  term  of 
office,  62,  73;  salary,  63,  73; 
and  administrative  depart- 
ments, 66,  67,  68;  appoint- 
ments, 66,  68,  69,  70,  71 ;  and 
annual  budget,  73,  87;  power 
to  administer  punishment, 
78;  responsible  for  expendi- 
tures, 82. 

Missouri  constitution,  6. 

Model  charter  provisions,  ix. 

Municipal,  misrule,  3;  corpora- 
tions, 6;  elections,  1 1 ;  bonds, 
32,  83,  85,  89,  90,  92,  93; 
government,  39,  40,  41;  ad- 
ministration, 58;  courts,  68; 
bond  issue,  89,  90,  91,  92|  93. 
104 


INDEX 

N  Public  hearing,  79. 

Public  improvements,  develop- 

Nomination,    method,    9,    10,  ment,  47. 

12;   freedom,  11;   party,  12;  Public-utility  corporations,  91; 
unrestricted,  12.  municipalization,  91. 
Non-partisan  primaries,  10;  bal-  Public-utility  franchises,  grant- 
lot,  13.  ing,   89,   90;    perpetual,   91; 
Q  indeterminate,    91,    92,    93, 
94;     control    of    stock,    92; 
Office-seeker,    professional,    50.  power  of  inspection,  92,  94. 
Official  ballot,  9,  11,  12.  Purchasing-agent,  67,  75,  85. 
Ordinances,  city,  88. 
Organization,   power  of,  63.  p 

p  Recall,  the,  reverse  of  election, 

2;  considered,  26,  27,  33,  34; 

Pamphlets    on    the    city-man-  petition,  28,  29,  35;  election, 

ager  plan,  99.  28,  29,  35,  36;   to  safeguard. 

Party,  bosses,  9;   machinery,  9;  29;   ballot,  35;   and  bond  is- 

primaries,  10;  ballot,  11.  sue,  89. 

Patronage,  abuse,  42;    distrib-  Records,  efficiency,  71. 

uting,  56;   official,  59.  Re-election,  eligible,  36. 

Pay-roll,  city,  86.  Referendum,  the,  2,  31,  32,  34, 

Petition,    for    nomination,    11;  83,  89. 

recall,    28,    29,    30,    35,    36;  Registration,  adequate,  13. 

percentage  of  votes  required.  Removal,  power  of,  58,  63,  66, 

29,   35.   36,   37;    for  special  68,  73,  79;    from  office,  71, 

election,  36,  37,  38.  72,  73,  79. 

Political,  organizations,  5;  par-  Representation,       proportional 

ties,  10,  II,  20;   machine,  58,  system,  17,  18,  19,  20,  30. 

59-  Responsibility,  diffusion  of,  43. 
Polling-places,   25. 

Power,   separation    of,    43;    of  e 

removal,  63,  66,  68,  71,  72,  73. 

Preferential     ballot,      13,     15;  Safety    and    Welfare    Depart- 

sample,  16;   counting,  17.  ment,  66,  74. 
Primaries  established,  10.  Salary,  of  mayor,  63,  73;    de- 
Primary,  legislation,  ii;    elec-  duction,  71,  78. 

tions,   II.  Self-government,  local,  32. 

Promotions,  system,  71,  77,  78.  Short-ballot  movement,  18,  48. 

105 


APPLIED   CITY  GOVERNMENT 

Spoils  system,  introduction,  42;  Vote,  right  to,  21;  average,  29, 

Jacksonian,  56,  57;  attacked,  30. 

59.  Votes,  counting,  16,  17,  18. 

State  legislatures,  control  over  Voters,    identification,    8,    13; 

cities,  5,  6.  qualified,  22,  35,  36,  37;  per- 

Statements,  monthly,  82,  84,  85.  centage    required   for   recall 

Suffrage,  universal  manhood,  8.  petition,  29,  30,  35. 

Suspension,  groimds  for,  71.  Voting,    qualifications,    8;     il- 
legal, 8,  12,  13;   preferential, 

Y  16;    intelligent,  48;    propor- 
tional-representation system. 

Taxpayers,  and  bond  issues,  90.  17,  18,  19,  20. 
Term  of  office,  49,  52,  69,  72, 

75.  77- 

Transfers,    departmental,    71,  W 
78. 

y  Ward  elections,  46,  47. 
"Ward  politics,"  47. 

Vacancies,    by   recall,   36;     in  Works  on  American  city  gov- 

commission,  53.  ernment,  97,  98. 


THE  END 


Sf 


St 

St 
Si 
Si 


THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED  BELOW 


AN  INITIAL  FINE  OP  25  CENTS 

WILL  BE  ASSESSED  FOR  FAILURE  TO  RETURN 
THIS  BOOK  ON  THE  DATE  DUE.  THE  PENALTY 
WILL  INCREASE  TO  SO  CENTS  ON  THE  FOURTH 
DAY  AND  TO  $1.00  ON  THE  SEVENTH  DAY 
OVERDUE. 


SEP  241939 

^fP  25  ^.     - 

**   »IWr 

f 

YB  50456 


,' 

^f;3f  7^- 

J"S3i>-4- 

/3 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 

